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Law in the Digital Age:
How Visual Communication Technologies are Transforming the Practice, 
Theory, and Teaching of Law
Richard K. Sherwin*, Neal Feigenson**, & Christina Spiesel***
Law has always followed significant changes in mind and culture. Our era is no 
exception. Law today has entered the digital age. The way law is practiced – how truth 
and justice are represented and assessed – is increasingly dependent on what appears on 
electronic screens in courtrooms, law offices, government agencies, and elsewhere.  The 
way law is theorized and taught must also adapt to these altered conditions. This is not 
simply a matter of surface rhetoric or style. What is at stake is nothing short of a 
paradigm shift in the way we think about how legal meanings are made, disseminated, 
and construed.
For decades now it has been generally understood in the realm of the human
sciences1 that interpretations of truth and falsity and judgments of liability and guilt are 
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1
 Paul Ricoeur notes the distinction between knowledge in the natural sciences as opposed to the human 
sciences as follows:  “For in natural knowledge, man grasps only phenomena distinct from himself, the 
fundamental ‘thingness’ of which escapes him.  In the human order, on the other hand, man knows man; 
however alien another man may be to us, he is not alien in the sense of an unknowable physical thing.  The 
difference of status between natural things and the mind dictates the difference of status between
explanation and understanding.  Man is not radically alien to man because he offers signs of his own 
existence.  To understand these signs is to understand man.”  Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Social 
Sciences 49 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1981).
2socially constructed and, to a significant degree, culturally contingent.2 Many other 
disciplines, including the philosophy of science,3 the philosophy of language,4 and 
linguistics,5 also recognize that meaning depends on context and that truth depends on the 
ways in which it is represented.  Indeed, new studies of the physiology of perception 
indicate that even our most basic contacts with reality are socially mediated and 
constructed.6 In short, across many disciplines, scholars have sought to explain how 
knowledge is locally constructed through culturally embedded practices7 and through 
diverse techniques of investigation and representation.8  So too in Anglo-American legal 
studies, many have recognized that legal meaning is produced by the ways law is 
practiced,9 and that rhetoric in its many guises is constitutive of, not opposed to, truth.10
Nevertheless, the cultural shift from an objectivist to a constructivist approach to 
human knowledge has not been anxiety-free.11 Many participants in and observers of the 
legal system in particular continue to experience uneasiness with the semioticians’ 
wisdom that “it’s all signs.” 12 Their fear seems to be that embracing this constructivist 
insight would undercut confidence in the capacity of legal proceedings (paradigmatically,
2 E.g., Max Black, Models and Metaphors (1962); Ricoeur, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that “hermeneutics 
itself puts us on guard against the illusion or pretension of neutrality” in the sense of being free from 
presuppositions).
3 E.g., Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope (1999).
4 E.g., J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (1962); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations (3d ed. 1958).
5 E.g., Eve Sweetser, From Etymology to Pragmatics (1990).
6
 Gregory S. Berns  et al., “Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During 
Mental Rotation,” Biological Psychiatry, available online June 22, 2005; see infra p. xx and note xx (in 
Part II(i)). 
7
 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (1983); Bruno Latour, Science in Action (1987); Bruno Latour & Steve 
Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1986); Richard Shweder, Thinking Through Cultures (1991).
8
 Peter Galison, Image and Logic (1997); Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (1983).
9 E.g., Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1962); see infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying text 
(on cultural legal studies scholarship).
10 E.g., Richard K. Sherwin, “Dialects and Dominance:  A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of 
Confessions,” 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729 (1988); Richard K. Sherwin, “Law Frames:  Historical Truth and 
Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case,” 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
11 E.g., Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1985).
12 E.g., Thomas A. Sebeok, Signs (1994).
3trials) to yield provable truths about the world.13  An unbridgeable gap between what 
legal decision makers believe they need to know and what, on reflection, they seem able 
to know is for many a cause for real concern. Within this late modern (or postmodern) 
mindset, there is a heightened sense of inhabiting a universe of representations that seems
to turn the urge for real world knowledge back upon itself, as if in an endless regression, 
like some spectacular baroque tapestry or infinite arabesque endlessly folding in upon 
itself.14
This vertiginous sense of a lack of grounding has intensified in the digital age.  
Digital technologies allow the pictures15 and words from which meanings are composed 
13 See, e.g., the “Received View” of trials in Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (1999); see also
Charles Nesson, “The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,” 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985).
14 See Richard K. Sherwin, “Anti-Oedipus, Lynch:  Initiatory Rites and the Ordeal of Justice,” in Law on 
the Screen 106, 126 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2005) (“[L]ike 
arabesques endlessly improvising their monadic design, baroque ornamentation proliferated, dizzying, 
decentering, even nauseating in their spatial onslaught.”). See also Heinrich Wolfflin, Renaissance and 
Baroque 34 (1964) (noting that the baroque seeks to stimulate the imagination through infinite figurations); 
Gilles Deleuze, The Fold 3 (1993) (“[T]he Baroque differentiates its folds in two ways, by moving along 
two infinities, as if infinity were composed of two stages or floors: the pleats of matter, and the folds of the 
soul.”).  The notion that we live in a universe of endless representations is experienced by some not as a 
source of anxiety but rather as an opportunity for freedom and self-realization. See, e.g., Vilem Flusser, The 
Shape of Things: A Philosophy of Design 65 (1999) (“What the cultural revolution now under way is all 
about is that we have gained the ability to set alternative worlds alongside the one taken by us as given.”); 
Robert Jay Lifton, The Protean Self: Human Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation 1 (1999) (“We are 
becoming fluid and many-sided. Without quite realizing it, we have been evolving a sense of self 
appropriate to the restlessness and flux of our time.”).  See also The Matrix (Warner Studios, 1999) 
(echoing the cyber-romantic credo that “anything is possible,” we hear Neo, the film’s main protagonist, 
announce the cyber-utopia that is to come:  “I'm going to show these people what you don't want them to 
see.  I'm going to show them a world without you, a world without rules and controls, without borders or 
boundaries, a world where anything is possible. Where we go from there is a choice I leave to you.”).  For a 
critique of cyberculture’s utopian strands, see, e.g., Kevin Robins, Into the Image: Culture and Politics in 
the Field of Vision (1996).
15
 Throughout this article we use “picture” to refer to any material visual representation and “image” to 
refer to any immaterial visual referent (inspired by a picture, text, another image, or anything else).  For 
instance, we might speak of the image of the Mona Lisa deployed in the Prince spaghetti sauce ads in a 
campaign designed by M&R Hess in the mid-1980s (see http://www.hessdesignworks.com/Mona’s.html).  
Their design presented a pair of pictures:  one, the “regular” Mona Lisa, the other, the “chunky” version.  
On February 8, 1999, the New Yorker featured a picture of Monica Lewinsky as Mona Lisa that must have 
been read by those who saw the Prince ad as (among other things) a comment about the young woman’s 
weight.  The cover of the June 2005 AARP Bulletin similarly harks back both to Leonardo’s masterpiece 
and the Prince campaign with a picture of an aged, heavy Mona Lisa in the style of Fernando Botero (who 
made his own version of the DaVinci in 1977).  Following our terminology, the picture is the AARP cover; 
4to be seamlessly modified and recombined in any fashion whatsoever, while the Internet 
allows practically anyone, anywhere, to disseminate meanings just about everywhere.
The Enlightenment-era insistence upon essentialist foundations (whether exemplified by 
Locke’s empiricism, Kant’s rational categories, or other totalizing epistemologies) is 
being challenged by digital experience, which has helped to inspire an alternative model 
of knowledge and reality as a centerless and constantly morphing network of relations.16
The task before us is to make sense of the practice of law in this non-essentialist,
screen-dominated, and pervasively visual digital era.  How might legal decision makers, 
legal academics, and the interested public come to understand what is already recognized 
in many other fields, namely, that representations can thoroughly mediate knowledge 
without seeming to dissolve that knowledge into mere adversarial contentions?17
the DaVinci reference, the Botero reference, and the Prince ad campaign are all images to which the picture 
alludes (or which the picture evokes).  Many variant uses of “image,” “picture,” “visual representation,” 
and the like may be found in the literature; ours is consistent with that of visual theorist W. J. T. Mitchell.  
W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology (1986); W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory 4 n.5 (1994); see also Part II infra.  
16 See Richard Rorty, “Foreword,” in Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism & Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, & Law
xvii (2004) (“[T]he Internet provides a model for things in general – thinking about the World Wide Web 
helps us to get away from Platonic essentialism, the quest for underlying natures, by helping us to see 
everything as a constantly changing network of relations.”) In audio form this model may be best 
represented in audio form by “the Mix” (see, e.g., Paul D. Miller, a/k/a DJ Spooky, Rhythm Science
(2004)), and in visual form by the complex and ever changing network of relations known as the World 
Wide Web (see infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying text (Part II(iv))).  Of course, computer scientists 
and engineers who help make digital experience possible might share a different perspective.  For them, 
cyberculture is enabled by technology that relies on mathematical and other scientific reasoning which may 
be regarded as a thoroughly Enlightenment (or Cartesian) enterprise.  See, e.g., Vilem Flusser, Towards A 
Philosophy of Photography 68 (1983) (“[Apparatuses] are omniscient and omnipotent. For in these 
universes, a concept, an element of the program of the apparatus, is actually assigned to every point, every 
element of the universe.”)   
17
 The split between “true” knowledge (as the product of universal Reason or essentialist categories) and 
“mere” eloquence (as the historically contingent offshoot of the art of persuasion or digital aesthetics) 
recapitulates the perennial quarrel between ancients and moderns, which is to say, between the scientific 
rationality of philosophical dialectics and the “techné” or craft of rhetoric. See, e.g., Nancy Struever, The 
Language of History in the Renaissance 5-39 (1970).  To the extent that law and truth are rooted in 
contingent (historical) social practices, however, the continued applicability of rhetoric to the study and 
practice of law remains assured.  Id. at 180 (linking the “rhetorical emphasis on language” to the “social 
use of language.”).  From this standpoint, the ethical capacity to distinguish between hypocrisy and truth 
depends not on “scientific capacity,” but rather on the “linguistic virtuosity” of the vigilant and virtuous 
(Struever’s “urbane”) individual.  Id. at 192.  See also Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse 97 (1987) (“The 
enduring value or applicability of rhetoric as a discipline is to be gauged . . . in exact proportion to its 
5Securing this realization makes way for the next query, one that typifies a more self-
reflexively constitutive outlook,18 namely:  What kinds of knowledge and meaning are 
created, and with what outcomes, when they are visually and digitally constructed in 
particular ways?19
Many practicing lawyers are already deeply engaged by these questions.20  They 
have to be.  Lawyers know that winning cases means persuading their audiences to 
believe in their stories of what happened and their understandings of the legal 
significance of particular events and actions, and they know that t o be successful they 
must understand the tools of communication at their (and their adversaries’) disposal – in 
particular, the visual and multimedia tools that digital technologies provide.  They also
know that they must comprehend the effects those tools can have on audiences’ 
perceptions, thoughts, and emotions.  Law teachers, on the other hand, are only gradually 
catching on to the range of implications flowing from the ensuing changes in mind, 
culture, and technology.21  Legal theorists, too, have been slow to grapple in a focused 
and systematic way with the new realities of law in the digital age.22
ability to analyse and codify the public and political dimensions of institutional discursive practice.”).  See 
generally Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value 183 (1988) (“Relativism in the sense of a 
conception of the world as continuously changing, irreducibly various, and multiply configurable does not 
conceive of itself as a logical deduction, or as an inescapable conclusion . . .[but rather as] the contingent
product of  many things:  contingent in the sense that it is a function not of ‘the way the world is’ but of the 
states of numerous particular systems interacting at a particular time and place.”).
18
 Ernst Cassirer, in Language and Myth (1946), calls this outlook a “mature constructivism.”
19 Cf. James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning 266 (1984).
20 See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text (Part I).   
21
 Some in the legal academy are well aware of the need to teach law students about the new technologies.  
See, e.g., Fredric I. Lederer, “Courtroom Technology and Its Educational Implications,” 8 Va. Educ. & 
Prac. 3 (1998); Courtroom 21 Project, http://www.wm.edu/law/courtroom21/ (last visited August 5, 2005); 
see also Kenneth J. Hirsh & Wayne Miller, “Law School Education in the 21st Century:  Adding 
Information Technology Instruction to the Curriculum,” 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 873 (2004).  To the 
best of our knowledge, however, no one has yet written about the broader psychological, rhetorical, and 
cultural implications of the legal uses of these technologies.
22
 To be sure, legal scholars have been thinking hard about a broad range of issues arising from the 
adaptation of substantive law to new digital technologies, such as computers and the generation and 
governance of cyberspace or the Internet, and the impact of digital information technology on law practice.  
6In this article we seek to provide an overview of what is happening to law and the 
legal meaning making process in the domain of practice, and what this visual/digital 
transformation requires of those who would theorize and teach law under new cultural, 
cognitive, and technological conditions. In short, we seek to construct a new framework 
for understanding the transformed practice of law in the digital age. Part I spells out in 
more detail what the new domain of visual and digital legal practice looks like.23 Part II 
offers a jurisprudential method for exploring law’s visual and digital mediation.24 Part III 
begins to address how legal education needs to be retooled to equip law students for 
practice in a digital environment.25 Part IV assess es the impact of the visual digital
revolution in a broader context and considers the challenges that lie ahead.26
Part I:  Re-envisioning Legal Practice
Here are some scenes from contemporary legal practice:
• In a recent class action against some of the world’s largest tobacco 
companies, plaintiffs’ lawyers contended that the defendant companies 
were being deceitful when they denied knowledge of the addicting 
properties of nicotine.  At trial a simple computer simulation demonstrated 
how nitrogen molecules had been added to cigarettes for the sole purpose 
of facilitating the rapid intake of nicotine.  The color-coded images made 
See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, & Spleens:  Law and the Construction of the Information 
Society (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Code (1999); Richard Susskind, Transforming the Law:  Essays on 
Technology, Justice and the Legal Marketplace (2000); Yokhai Benkler, “Coase's Penguins, or Linux and 
the Nature of the Firm,” 112 Yale L. J. 369 (2002); Paula Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, “The Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property,” 111 Yale L. J. 1575 (2002).  The realities we have in mind here, 
however, range far beyond legal issues regarding intellectual property and the applicability of traditional 
doctrinal categories and principles to the virtual realities of cyberspace. 
23 See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text.
7plain that the tobacco companies had designed their product as a 
maximally efficient nicotine delivery system.27
• In its highly publicized 2002 prosecution of Michael Skakel for the 1975 
murder of Martha Moxley, lawyers for the State of Connecticut used an 
interactive CD-ROM to display all of their demonstrative evidence 
throughout the trial, including photographs of the neighborhood and crime 
scene, diagrams of the locations at which real evidence had been found, 
and an audiotape of a telephone interview Skakel had given to a journalist 
in the late 1990s.  During closing argument, the prosecution replayed 
excerpts from the audiotape and simultaneously projected a transcript of 
Skakel’s words onto a screen for jurors to follow.  In the closing’s most 
dramatic moment, jurors heard Skakel describe the panic he felt when 
Martha’s mother asked him about her daughter the morning after the night 
of the murder – and simultaneously saw on the screen a photograph of 
Martha’s lifeless body next to the transcript of Skakel’s words.28
• For an insider trading case against the investment firm Kidder, Peabody 
and its former executive and corporate takeover wizard Martin Siegel, 
lawyers for the plaintiff Maxus Corporation (which eventually purchased 
the target company) prepared a closing argument video that incorporated 
animated graphics, archival photographs, excerpts from videotaped 
depositions, and other materials to show that Siegel had conspired with 
27
 [Reference]
28 Connecticut v. Skakel, No. FST CR00-135792T (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. of Norwalk/Stamford) (transcript 
of June 3, 2002).  See Brian Carney & Neal Feigenson, “Visual Persuasion in the Michael Skakel Trial:  
Enhancing Advocacy Through Interactive Media Presentations,” 19 Crim. Justice 22 (2004).
8Ivan Boesky to drive up the target’s stock price.  Siegel’s repeated refusal 
to testify at his deposition – he took the Fifth Amendment over 600 times 
– was captured by nine sequential clips of Siegel looking down at a 
prepared text.  As one clip followed another on the screen they took the 
shape of a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the popular TV game show 
“The Hollywood Squares.”  When the grid was complete, the audience 
both saw and heard the simultaneous Siegels turning the Fifth Amendment 
right to refuse to testify into a self-protective mantra.29
Lawyers, as rhetoricians, have always known that effective persuasion requires 
speaking in terms that their audiences understand.  And they are now adapting to a 
culture in which audiences are accustomed by their everyday work and leisure 
experiences with television, movies, print media, and computers to rely on visual (as well 
as audio and print-based) information.  Adding to their traditional demonstrative arsenal 
of maps, diagrams, models, and photographs, lawyers (and the litigation consultants who 
help them) are now introducing new kinds of visual and multimedia displays.  They 
assemble video previews of the strengths of their cases and show them to opposing 
counsel in the hope of obtaining favorable settlements.30 They shoot and edit day-in-the-
life movies of accident victims for personal injury cases31 and compile video montages of 
murder victims’ lives to be used as victim impact evidence in sentencing proceedings.32
29
 Avi Stachenfeld & Christopher Nicholson, “Blurred Boundaries:  An Analysis of the Close Relationship 
Between Popular Culture and the Practice of Law,” 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 903 (1996); Kurt Eichenwald, 
“Kidder Will Pay Maxus $165 Million to Settle Insider Suit,” N.Y. Times, October 12, 1992, at D1. 
30 See, e.g., John A. Tarantino, Personal Injury Forms:  Discovery & Settlement § 506 (2004) (settlement 
videos); Bill Buckley, How to Use Video Settlement Brochures (1986) (videotape on file with authors).
31 See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph, Modern Visual Evidence § 4.06 (1997); Bill Buckley, How to Use Day-in-
the-Life Videos (1986) (videotape on file with authors). 
32 E.g., Hicks v. Arkansas, 327 Ark. 727 (1997) (upholding admission of 14-minute video consisting of 
approximately 160 photographs spanning victim’s life); Salazar v. Texas, 90 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 
9Software programs like Sanction and Trial Director enable them to replay video
depositions for judge and jury and simultaneously to display deponents’ words on a 
scrolling transcript.33 Advocates digitally enhance photographs and create Photoshop 
overlays of different forensic images.34 They use computer animations to illustrate expert 
witness reconstructions of crimes and accidents.35  To set the scene for eyewitness 
testimony they can use “virtual reality views” – seamless, 360-degree representations of a 
scene, composited from digital photographs, with which witnesses can interact, moving 
in any direction and zooming in or out as desired.36  And to build opening statements and 
closing arguments around multimedia displays that integrate text, photos, video clips, 
original graphics, and sound files, lawyers need not rely on the sorts of sophisticated 
consultants who produced the arguments in the three case examples above.  They can do 
it themselves with PowerPoint.37
The ongoing transformation of law practice by digital visual and multimedia 
technologies can be gauged in part by the growing numbers of high-tech courtrooms,38
legal visual consultants,39 and instructional materials for lawyers.40 But even more 
2002) (overturning trial court’s admission of 17-minute video montage of photographs of victim’s life, 
nearly half of which depicted the victim as an infant or small child, and which was set to background music 
including “My Heart Will Go On” from the movie Titanic).  
33
 Verdict Systems LLC, Sanction (CD-ROM); Indata Corporation, Trial Director (CD-ROM).
34 See State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781 (2004).
35 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note xx, at §§ 8.01-8.06.
36 See, e.g., Jeremy Barnett, “The United Kingdom,” 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 687, 693-94 (2004) 
(discussing use of “virtual reality” in Bloody Sunday Inquiry) (see infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying 
text (Part II(iv)); Darius Whelan, “The Bloody Sunday Tribunal,” exhibit at first International Conference 
on Visual Literacy, Cork, Ireland, April 14-15, 2005; e-mail from Brian Carney, President, WIN 
Interactive, to Neal Feigenson (February 8, 2005) (on file with author). 
37 See, e.g., Deanne C. Siemer & Frank D. Rothschild, PowerPoint® 2002 for Litigators (2002).
38
 Elizabeth C. Wiggins, “What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Effects of Courtroom 
Technology,” 12 Wm. & Mary Bill  Rts. J. 731 (2004); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Meghan A. Dunn, & George 
Cort, “Federal Judicial Center Survey on Courtroom Technology” (December 2003), available at 
http://www.fjc.org.
39
 Reliable, comprehensive data on this are difficult to locate, but indirect evidence comes from the increase 
in the number of trial consultants generally, some of whom offer visual production services; see Amy J. 
10
importantly, the proliferation of digital and visual tools is profoundly changing the way 
litigators approach their jobs.  First, the ability to put so much of their thinking into visual 
form leads lawyers to brainstorm and strategize their cases differently.  When lawyers
visualize a case, different possible relationships between elements can emerge that 
remain invisible when those same elements are described only verbally.  This is because
visual spatial arrangements are different from linear linguistic sequences.41 For example, 
one can talk about information channels in a complex corporate hierarchy, but a box-and-
line chart showing who communicated with whom can make instantly intelligible the 
paths of information and influence.  Second, the process of assembling and designing the 
visual presentations to be shown during negotiations, arbitration proceedings, or trials
forces lawyers to prepare their cases earlier and more thoroughly than they would 
otherwise.  Advocates must think through their theories of the case up front so that they 
can plan for, design, and integrate apt visuals at the right spots in their presentations.42
Third, as scientific and other complex evidence plays an ever-larger role in legal disputes, 
the move to the visual enables lawyers and their expert witnesses to teach their cases 
more effectively to judges and juries.  By using pictures as well as words, lawyers can 
present their cases in ways that interact more effectively with their audiences’ diverse 
Posey & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Trial Consulting (2005); Greta Rusanow, Knowledge Management and 
the Smarter Lawyer (2003).   
40 See, e.g., Michael Arkfeld, The Digital Practice of Law (2001); Ann Brenden & John Goodhue, 
Persuasive Computer Presentations:  The Essential Guide for Lawyers (2001); G. Christopher Ritter, 
Creating Winning Trial Strategies and Graphics (2004); Siemer & Rothschild, supra note xx.
41
 Think of this as the visual equivalent of the statement often made by writers that they find out what they 
are thinking in the act of writing.  (We have more to say about visualization and visual thinking infra notes 
xx- xx and accompanying text (Part II).)  
42
 As the lead prosecutor for the State of Connecticut in the Skakel trial said (Carney & Feigenson, supra 
note xx, at 34).
11
styles of learning.43  This enhanced capacity for visual representation fosters in 
practitioners a mind-set of “lawyer-as-instructor” which may, over time, effectively 
compete with the more pejorative popular images of the lawyer as “hired gun” and 
unethical manipulator.44
These developments make it incumbent upon us to ask:  How and what exactly do 
juries and judges learn when lawyers use digital and visual media to present evidence and 
argument?  And how does the shift to these media affect the way that lawyers and their 
audiences reconstruct reality for the purpose of rendering legal judgment? In the next 
part we outline a new approach to understanding how legal meanings are made, and made 
sense of, in a pervasively visual digital era.
Part II:  Re-envisioning Legal Theory
Today, it is well accepted that our sense of history, like our sense of memory and 
self-identity, is in large measure the result of composing and telling stories.45 And just as 
it is through stories that we construct the meaning of individual and collective experience,
so also it is through stories that we are moved to blame or exonerate others.46 But as 
Robert A. Ferguson noted more than twenty years ago, “we can only tell the stories we 
43 See, e.g., Richard E. Mayer, “Systematic Thinking Fostered by Illustrations in Scientific Text,” 81 J. 
Educ. Psychol. 240 (1989); Richard E. Mayer & Richard B. Anderson, “The Instructive Animation:  
Helping Students Build Connections Between Words and Pictures in Multimedia Learning,” 84 J. Educ. 
Psychol. 444 (1992); see generally Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences (1993).   
44
 Of course, new digital communication technologies also open up new opportunities for questionable 
practices which need to be understood and effectively countered.  A major goal of our jurisprudential and 
pedagogic program (see infra Parts II and III) is precisely to make lawyers more astute observers and critics 
of their adversaries’ digital and visual presentations.
45
 Richard K. Sherwin, “Picturing Justice:  Images of Law & Lawyers in the Visual Media,” 30 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 891 (1996); see also Anthony Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law (2000); Dan P. 
McAdams, The Stories We Live By (1993); Theodore R. Sarbin (ed.) Narrative Psychology (1986); Roy 
Schafer, Retelling A Life (1992); Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth (1982). 
46 E.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, “The Story Model for Juror Decision Making,” in Inside the 
Juror 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
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know” – and know how to tell.47  To an increasing extent, storytelling in popular culture 
today is visual. Digital pictures, conveyed through television, movies, videos, CD-ROM, 
DVD, the Internet, and traditional print media, have come to dominate our 
entertainments, our politics, our news, and our methods of education, and now they are 
infusing law practice as well.48 In fact, pictures have come to be seen by some as more 
real than technologically unmediated reality.49  It should not prove surprising, then, that it 
is the play of pictures invoking other pictures (together with other, more implicit
meanings) that we see when lawyers visually reconstruct reality in the courtroom.50  Yet 
legal scholars have been less quick than their counterparts in other academic fields to 
heed the implications of the cultural shifts to the visual and the digital.51  Consequently, 
they have not yet adequately addressed such urgent questions as:  What sort of 
knowledge and meanings do lawyers construct when they picture reality for judges and 
jurors?  How do lawyers using digital visual displays lead  legal decision makers and the 
public to take up desired meanings and participate in the reconstruction of one story, one
version of reality, rather than another? 
47
 Robert A. Ferguson, “Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown,” 6 Yale J. L. & Hum. 37, xx 
(1994).
48 See supra notes xx-xx and accompanying text (Part I).
49 See Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies (1990); Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place
(1995).
50 E.g., Philip N. Meyer, “’Desperate for Love’:  Cinematic Influences upon a Defendant’s Closing 
Argument,” 18 Vt. L. Rev. 721 (1994); Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop (2000).  
51
 Exceptions do exist, however, including Jennifer Mnookin’s exemplary work on the history and theory of 
demonstrative evidence.  Jennifer L. Mnookin, “The Image of Truth:  Photographic Evidence and the 
Power of Analogy,” 10 Yale J. L. & Hum. 1 (1998); Jennifer L. Mnookin & Nancy West, “Theaters of 
Proof:  Visual Evidence and the Law in Call Northside 777,” 13 Yale J. L. & Hum. 329 (2001).  For a 
recent attempt to integrate visual theory into the study of visual evidence, see Christopher J. Buccasfusco, 
“Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective,” 58 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 609 (2004).  There is also a burgeoning literature on law and film. See, e.g., David Black, Law In Film
(1999); John Denvir, Legal Reelism (1996); Leslie Moran et al., Law’s Moving Image (2004); Austin Sarat, 
Lawrence Douglas, & Martha Merrill Umphrey (eds.), Law on the Screen (2005). 
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These questions, of course, are another way of posing the pivotal query that 
guides Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric, namely:  What are the available means of 
persuasion in the face of a given legal conflict or controversy?52 What story forms and 
what images, expressing what analogies, metaphors, and symbols, are best suited to win 
the hearts and minds of a given audience at a given point in time?  On which sources 
(topoi) should the advocate draw and how should the presentation be styled to be most 
persuasive?  And how should the advocate deflect an adversary’s rhetorical strategy?  
One way or another, everything we discuss here has to do with rhetoric, because each
discipline or field of knowledge that we engage says something different  about the 
means, modalities, and effects of persuasion, the discerning use of which it is the
rhetorician’s job to practice and teach.
We may accept as a useful point of departure Aristotle’s teaching that it is the 
rhetorician’s main task to identify the available means of persuasion in a given context.  
Today, however, we need a more expansive restatement of this task, one that incorporates
insights into the meaning making process from a variety of scholarly domains, including 
cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, linguistics, art history, media 
studies, film studies, and advertising.  Indeed, interdisciplinarity is the sign of our times.  
The widespread recognition that meanings are socially (as well as psychologically and 
culturally) constructed entails an increasing need for multiple systems of interpretation.  
Meaning making and understanding become more complex precisely because no one 
interpretive frame or expert discourse can be taken for granted, and because each 
interpretive tool foregrounds different elements of the object of study. Visual 
communication seems especially well suited to an interdisciplinary approach.  Our 
52
 Aristotle, Rhetoric I. ii. 1 at 15 (John Henry Freese trans., Harvard University Press 1926) (c. 330 B.C.).
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culture is flooded with images whose import may be simultaneously overdetermined and 
indeterminate, whose layers of significance can be teased apart only by means of a varied 
array of interpretive tools.  In the domain of law, legal pragmatism, with its “lesson of 
tentativeness,” as Richard Posner has noted, similarly encourages recourse to multiple 
tools from a variety of disciplinary toolboxes.53
On pragmatic grounds, therefore, as well as in response to new developments in 
theory, our method of inquiry into law in the visual and digital age is constructivist and 
multi-perspectival.  We explore how the meanings that are made when advocates argue or 
judges and jurors decide, like the meanings that emerge from any other activities in a 
culture, are built from the participants’ perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and 
technological resources.54  Advocates draw, largely intuitively, from a toolbox of such 
resources when they conceive and design their evidence and arguments; their audiences 
implicitly rely on the same tools when they take up the advocates’ messages.  We aim to 
make these tools and their contextual uses explicit.  We present no totalizing or
“essentializing” first principles, recognizing the constructivist premise that both 
knowledge and the means of knowing are immanent, contingent, and contextually 
sensitive.
We offer below four sets of interdisciplinary insights into law’s visual and digital 
meaning-making practices today.  This illustrative (but hardly exhaustive) set of tools 
includes:  the neurobiology and psychology of vision; cognitive psychology and narrative 
53 See Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 34 (2003).  See also id. at 84:  “[Legal 
pragmatism] relies on advances in economics, game theory, political science, and other social-scientific 
disciplines rather than on unexamined political  preferences and aversions to take the place of legal 
formalism.”  Our multidisciplinary toolkit shares some items with Posner’s (e.g., cognitive and social 
psychology) but goes well beyond it; see infra text accompanying note xxx [end of part II].
54
 Richard K. Sherwin, “Nomos and Cinema,” 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1519, 1528 (2001); see also sources 
cited supra note x [Geertz, Latour, Shweder].
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theory; media studies and reality judgments; and the cultural psychology of digital
experience. No one tool or insight explains everything, but each advances the 
understanding of how advocates and their audiences make meanings.  Taken together, 
these multiple tools and insights from a variety of disciplines establish a network of 
overlapping and mutually informative methods of analysis and persuasion.  This network 
constitutes the more expansive domain of rhetoric in the digital age.  Singly and jointly 
applied, these rhetorical tools advance the advocate’s twin goals of credibly representing 
reality while persuasively activating decision makers’ memories, emotions, and beliefs in 
their pursuit of judgment. 
(i)  Vision science and visual thinking:  Why pictures matter. When judges and 
jurors scrutinize photographs, videos, computer animations, and other graphic materials 
(such as charts, graphs, and maps) used as demonstrative evidence as they strive to reach 
decisions, they are doing something very different from what they are doing when they 
listen to testimony or read documents.  When they look at pictures they are reading a 
different kind of text55 which comes with its own methods of decoding, history(ies), and
ways of resonating with the rest of our culture. To appreciate how profoundly the visual 
turn is affecting law, therefore, it is necessary to understand a bit about vision and 
visuality – what is distinctive about visual perception and visual thinking, and why visual 
displays can exert an especially strong influence on legal judgment.
55
 We use “text” to refer “not only to written materials but also to painting, architecture, information 
systems, and to all attempts at representation whatever form they may take.”  Stuart Sim (ed.), Dictionary 
of Postmodern Thought 390 (1998).  On our working definition of “picture” as opposed to “image,” see
supra note xx.     
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We begin with the biology and neuropsychology of vision.56  In spite of the 
apparently seamless unfolding of the external world through visual perception, people 
actually construct their ideas about the world through discrete bits of information that 
they assemble into visual images.  With a speed that makes the process seem automatic, 
people arrive at a conscious sense of continuous perceptions.  But that is not the way 
things are before the brain composes the coherence of perceived reality.57  To make order 
out of what might otherwise be a chaos of perceptions, people resort to rapid sortings of 
data, marking their relative importance so that they may rely on their perceptions to make 
quick judgments.  This capacity to sort perceptions and register their emotional 
significance rapidly allows people to know when to fight and when to flee,58 when they 
need to pay focused attention and when they can afford to be lost in mental clouds.  At 
least some of the emotional associations that a visual perception acquires attach well 
before anything like conscious processing occurs,59 which can lead to stereotyped 
thinking that goes unnoticed by the rationalizing cortex.60
56
 For good general sources, see, e.g., Stephen M. Kosslyn, Image and Brain (1994); Stephen E. Palmer, 
Vision Science (1999).
57
 Ann Marie Seward Barry, Visual Intelligence (1997); Donald D. Hoffman, Visual Intelligence (1998); 
Leif H. Finkel, “The Construction of Perception,” in Incorporations 393, 400 (Jonathan Crary & Sanford 
Kwinter eds., 1992).  Some of what cognition contributes to perception is indicated by visual illusions in 
which people see what literally isn’t there, or by their perception of a continuous visual field despite the 
blind spot (where the optic nerve meets the retina, the eye has no rods or cones to receive stimuli).  See, 
e.g., Richard L. Gregory, Eye and Brain (5th ed. 1997); Palmer, supra note xx, at 7-9, 33-34.  Note 
generally the parallel to the digital world, which is made up of discrete bits of information rather than the 
analog world of our experiences of it.  See infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying text (Part II(iv)).  
Saccadic eye movements are another example of intelligent (i.e., goal-oriented and problem-solving) but 
entirely subconscious behavior.  See Patricia Smith Churchland, Brain-Wise:  Studies in Neurophilosophy
50-51 (2002).    
58 See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (1996).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., John Dovidio & Samuel Gaertner, “Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias,” in Affect, 
Cognition, and Stereotyping 167 (Diane Mackie & David Hamilton eds., 1993); Susan T. Fiske,
“Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,” in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert, 
Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998); see also Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. 
Greenwald, “Implicit Association Test,” available at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited 
August 5, 2005).
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Visualization and visual thinking are quick; they are  also highly malleable.  Basic 
perceptual judgments are prone to social influence:  For example, people are likelier to 
see two similar objects as the same if told that others have seen them that way.61  Verbal 
information can remold visual interpretation and memories.  In one well-known 
experiment, participants shown a film of an automobile accident who were asked how 
fast the cars were going when they “smashed” into one another gave higher estimates of 
speed than participants who saw the identical film but were asked how fast the cars were 
going when they “collided with” one another – and, one week later, were likelier to recall 
having seen broken glass in the film, even though none was present.62  Captions guide the 
interpretation of pictures63 and suggestive questioning can induce not merely biased but 
entirely false visual memories.64
Visual thinking is malleable because the images that people think with “are not 
stored as facsimile pictures of things, or events, or words, or sentences.”65  There is no 
one place in the brain in which internal representations of visual percepts or mental 
imagery “come together.”66  When people need to think imagistically in response to a 
61
 Berns et al., supra note x.  Participants were given a visual thinking task:  They were shown paired 
pictures of configurations of connected square blocks and asked to determine whether the two were 
identical or mirror images of one another.  To do this, participants had to mentally rotate one of the pictures 
and decide whether the rotated image matched the other.  In undertaking this task, participants were prone 
to social influence:  They gave more incorrect answers when informed of incorrect answers that a group of 
fellow participants – actually experimental confederates – had given.  Moreover, fMRI scans showed that 
the brains of participants in the social influence condition tended to be activated in same areas used for 
visual processing.  Researchers interpreted these findings to suggest that social influence works by 
affecting the perceptions themselves and not by inclining participants to adjust their reports of what they 
had perceived to match what they were told the others had seen. 
62
 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, “Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction:  An Example of the 
Interaction Between Language and Memory,” 13 J. Verbal Learning & Verbal Behav. 585 (1974).
63 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note xx, at 597-601; Karen Slattery, “Visual Information in Viewer Interpretation 
and Evaluation of Television News Stories,” 10 J. Visual Literacy 26, 27 (1990).
64 See, e.g., D. Stephen Lindsay, “Recovered-Memory Experiences, in Recovered Memories of Child Sexual 
Abuse 142 (Sheila Taub ed., 1999).  
65 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error 100 (1994).
66 Finkel, supra note xx.
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given task, they do not simply retrieve intact the appropriate images from their 
neurological library.  Consequently, the beliefs and judgments that people may articulate 
in response to tasks eliciting visual thinking are not simple read-offs from some internal 
visual or quasi-visual mental reality,67 any more than their beliefs and judgments about 
the world in general are simply read-offs from external reality.  Rather, people 
(re)construct the mental images they use in their thinking as required by the task and the 
situation.68  A more apt metaphor for the mind than a library (or some equivalent
“container”) might be that of a short-order cook – and not one who dishes up just ham 
and eggs, but an artful French chef who can nearly instantly combine neural ingredients 
to create a sumptuous repast to order.69
In light of these features of visual perception and thinking, consider some of the 
ways in which pictures, in contrast to purely verbal communications, can affect legal 
decision makers’ thinking and judgments:70
• Pictures of all kinds – still or moving, diagrammatic or photorealistic –
tend to have a greater impact than non-visual expressions of the “same” 
information because pictures tend to be more vivid.  The greater salience 
67 M. R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 128-43, 192-93 (2003); 
see also Wittgenstein, supra note x, at ¶¶ 154, 180.
68 Recent findings in neuroscience show that people generally do not and need not build complete mental 
representations of their present situations, but instead “selectively represent the world on a need-to-know 
footing.” To function in the world – for instance, to move, reach, and grasp – people depend on their brains 
to generate “maps-on-demand” that process sensory information and translate it into neural programs that 
guide appropriate motor structures and hence effective behavior.  Churchland, supra note xx, at 309, 318.
69 See David F. Marks, “On the Relationship Between Imagery, Body, and Mind,” in Imagery:  Current 
Developments 1, 6 (Peter J. Hampson, David F. Marks, & John T. E. Richardson eds., 1990) (“Perceiving 
and imaging are not merely processes of identification brought about by looking and listening but active 
performances in which specific intentions, purposes, and actions need to be fulfilled”); see also J. J. 
Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 253 (1979), discussed in Sharon Helmer 
Poggenpohl & Dietmar R. Winkler, “Diagrams as Tools for Worldmaking,” 26 Visible Language 253-57 
(1992).  
70
 For a more detailed discussion, see Richard K. Sherwin, “Law in Popular Culture,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Law and Society 95, 99-100 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
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of visual information makes it likelier that the viewer will take in the 
information, remember it, and use it in subsequent judgment tasks.71
• Visual displays can convey more information than words alone and enable 
viewers to understand more.  For example, spatial arrays, graphs, and 
diagrams can show relationships between data that would remain obscure 
if the data remained in tabular notational form.72 Similarly, computer 
animated reconstructions of events can represent with clarity and precision 
small but legally significant changes within a given period of time (such as
the relative positions and speeds of vehicles prior to a collision).73 These 
factual details might remain difficult for a decision maker to imagine and 
thus harder to understand if left to verbal descriptions alone.74
• Photorealistic pictures tend to arouse cognitive and emotional responses
similar to those aroused by the real thing. For example, an IMAX movie 
71 See, e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom,” 49 J. Personality 
Assessment 659 (1985); Maryanne Martin & Rachel Williams, “Imagery and Emotion:  Clinical and 
Experimental Approaches,” in Imagery:  Current Developments 268, 268 (Peter J. Hampson, David F. 
Marks, & John T. E. Richardson eds., 1990) (“The more imageable the material, the better the recall.”)
(citing work of Paivio).
72 See, e.g., Stephen M. Kosslyn, Elements of Graph Design (1994); see also generally Edward R. Tufte, 
The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (1983); Edward R. Tufte, Envisioning Information (1990); 
Edward R. Tufte, Visual Explanations (1997).
73 See, e.g., Meghan A. Dunn, “The Effects of Computer Animation on Mock Jurors’ Decision Making,”  
poster presented at the annual conference of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San 
Antonio, TX (February, 2001) (copy on file with authors); Saul M. Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, 
“Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury:  Facilitative and Prejudicial Effects,” 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 
269 (1997).
74
 Computer animations can also depict objects or events that are simply too small, too large, or too 
ephemeral to be seen at all without technological intervention; see infra text following note xx (tobacco 
litigation animation).  On the other hand, some research has shown that computer animations may not assist 
legal decision making where audiences are able to visualize events adequately on the basis of verbal 
information and non-moving diagrams alone (see Dunn, supra note xx; Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Jordan H. 
Leibman, & Richard E. Fetter, “Seeing is Believing, Or Is It?  An Empirical Study of Computer 
Simulations as Evidence,” 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 257 (1999)).  In addition, animations may sometimes be 
instructionally inferior to static diagrams because animations make greater demands on viewers’ processing 
capacities (see Richard Lowe, “Extracting Information from an Animation During Complex Visual 
Learning,” 14 Eur. J. Psychol. Educ. 225 (1999)).    
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of a roller-coaster ride can induce vertigo in viewers who would remain
unruffled by a verbal description.75
• Unlike words, which are obviously constructed by the speaker and thus are 
understood to be at one remove from the reality they describe, 
photorealistic photographs, videos, and film can appear to be caused by
the external world76 without the taint of human mediation or authorial 
interpretation.77  Consequently, they tend to be accepted as highly credible
evidence of the reality they depict, even though they lack the other sensory 
modalities that the viewer would encounter in real life.78
• Unlike the linear communication of words, which must be taken in 
sequentially, much of a still picture’s meaning can be grasped all at once.  
75
 Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment:  Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator,” in Viewing 
Positions:  Ways of Seeing Film 114 (Linda Williams ed., 1995), explains how audiences for Lumiere’s 
Arrival of a Train at the Station were simultaneously terrified by the impression that the train was headed 
straight for them and pleased by their appreciation of film’s trompe l’oeil capabilities.  For research 
indicating that photographs can provoke emotional responses similar to those aroused by the real thing that 
in turn affect legal judgments, see Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon, & James R. P. Ogloff, “The Impact of 
Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial:  Probative or Prejudicial?,” 
21 Law & Hum. Behav. 485 (1997).  
76 Sometimes referred to as indexicality; see Paul Messaris, Visual Persuasion xvi (1997).
77 See Mnookin, supra note xx, at 16-17 (referring to O. W. Holmes’s description of the photograph as “a 
mirror with a memory”; cf. early photographer William Henry Fox Talbot’s description of it as the “pencil 
of nature.” And yet, people’s ability to understand what they see even in photorealistic pictures, as opposed 
to nature, depends critically on their awareness that every picture is a representation:  It is bounded, 
separated from reality by something that cues the reader that it is a text (see supra note xx) to be read. We 
can call this boundary a frame, but by that we do not mean what is commonly thought of as a decorative 
device for hanging pictures.  Being aware of the frame and its implications includes recognizing, first, that 
every picture that people make is an abstraction from nature:  A part of the possible perceptual field has 
been selected; the totality of sensory data has been reduced to one or two dimensions (sight, or sight and 
sound); and extraneous elements have usually been eliminated so that the signal is (relatively) clear (cf.
Tufte, supra note xx).  Understanding the picture requires identifying and appreciating the significance of 
each of these abstractions.  Second, viewers need to be aware that every picture comes framed cognitively 
and emotionally, loaded with meanings that derive from that genre of representation (e.g., photography, 
video) and people’s past experiences with it (through their previous encounters with examples of that 
genre) as well as from the creator’s specific compositional choices using the medium in which the work is 
realized. 
78
 Digital photography and video, however, make this claim highly problematic, as William J. Mitchell, The 
Reconfigured Eye (1994), and many others have observed; see infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying text 
(Part II(iv)). 
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It takes a lot less time and mental effort to see a picture than to read a 
thousand words.79  This allows decision makers to take in more 
information and to develop a better understanding of the case – or at least 
to feel that they have done so.80
• When people take in photorealistic pictures, they tend to believe that they 
have gotten all there is to get . Consequently, they are disinclined to 
pursue the matter further. This sense of communicative efficacy is even 
stronger in time-based media such as film, video, and computer animation, 
which offer the eye rapid visual sequences.  These tend to disable critical 
thinking because viewers are too busy attending to the picture immediately 
before their eyes to reflect on those that have gone before.81 As a result, 
compared to words, visual communications tend to generate less 
counterargument and hence more confidence in the judgments they 
support.
• When pictures are used to communicate propositional claims, at least 
some of their meaning always remains implicit.  Pictures cannot be 
reduced to explicit verbal propositions.82 In this respect, pictures are well
79 See, e.g., Stephen M. Kosslyn, Elements of Graph Design 10 (1994).
80
 What viewers tend to take in rapidly is the organization of the whole and the meaning associated at that 
level – think of how the phrase “get the picture” is used colloquially in other contexts.  By getting the 
gestalt, viewers may feel that they have understood what they need to know even though they have not 
bothered to explore the relations between all the parts of the picture.
81 See Barry, supra note xx, at 32, 46 (human attention is shaped by evolution to be captured by 
movement).  The more realistic and engrossing the visual display, the more pronounced this effect is likely 
to be:  For instance, the “sensory richness” of virtual reality “tend[s] to tie up mental capacity, reducing 
what is available for assessing the reality of an object or event.”  Michael A. Shapiro & Daniel G. 
McDonald, “I’m Not a Real Doctor, But I Play One in Virtual Reality:  Implications of Virtual Reality for 
Judgments About Reality,” 42 J. Comm. 94, 108 (1992).  
82 See, e.g., James Elkins, The Domain of Images 68-74 (1999) (discussing Nelson Goodman, Languages of 
Art (1976) and the density of pictorial symbol systems in contrast to verbal and notational symbol systems).
While there may be no “grammar” of images, there are rules for resolving conflicts between visual cues 
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suited to leaving intended meanings unspoken, as would-be persuaders 
may prefer to do – especially when evidentiary rules or social conventions
forbid making a given claim explicitly.83
• Finally, pictures, more so than words, convey meaning through 
associational logic which operates in large part subconsciously, through its 
emotional appeal.84 Thus, a person may be aware that a picture is strongly 
linked to an emotional response without knowing or understanding what 
the connection is.85 And when the emotional underpinnings of judgment
remain outside of awareness, they are less susceptible to effective critique 
and counterargument.86
Now let us consider some illustrations of how skillful advocates take advantage of 
these attributes of visual communication to help their audiences reconstruct reality.
Recall the class action against the big tobacco companies to which we alluded at the 
outset of Part I.  How better to convince jurors that the defendants wanted to keep their 
(Hoffman, supra note xx).  In addition, time-based visual media – such as comics, graphic novels, films, 
and video – can be thought of as having a grammar of sorts because the sequence qualifies how each frame 
is read and visual devices are used to build continuity across frames.  A final qualification is that certain 
specialized kinds of pictures, for instance, those consisting of mathematical diagrams with conventional 
notations, may be more or less reducible to explicit propositions (but cf. Elkins, supra, at 75). 
83 Visual displays can do this much better than words precisely because, not being themselves 
propositional, less of what they mean is anchored in what they “say.” To put it another way, visuals 
preserve plausible deniability.  For example, the “Willie Horton” ad run by the Republicans during the 
1988 presidential campaign didn’t say, “If you vote for Michael Dukakis, your wife or daughter may be 
raped by a scary black ex-con”; the ad didn’t have to, because it plainly implied the threat without having 
to articulate it.  Note also, however, that by leaving more meaning implicit, those who rely on pictures to 
communicate may run a greater risk that their audiences will not take up the intended meaning or, 
conversely, will take up meanings different from those intended.  
84
 Martin & Williams, supra note xx, at 268.
85 See, e.g., Robin Andersen, Consumer Culture & TV Programming 72-85 (1995) (on emotional impact of 
advertisements); see also LeDoux, supra note xx (on subconscious emotional influence). 
86
 Several psychologists and philosophers have recently emphasized that intuitive emotional responses tend 
to drive people’s moral (and legal) judgments, in part because people’s later conscious cognitive processing 
tends to rationalize decisions already reached rather than to subject them to truly critical scrutiny.  See, e.g., 
Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail:  A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment,” 108 Psychol. Rev. 814 (2001); Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks:  
A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom,” 110 Psychol. Rev. 197 (2003). 
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customers “hooked” on tobacco than to show how the addiction process actually works?  
That is precisely what the plaintiffs’ evidentiary graphic did.  Images of vividly colored 
ammonia molecules closely interacting with nicotine inside a cigarette made the product 
engineering process clear.  Subsequent images of key “nicotine binding sites” in the brain 
completed the picture.  Taken together, these instructive, easy to grasp, and highly 
memorable visual displays quickly and effortlessly conveyed complex technical 
information that went to the heart of the plaintiffs’ claim:  The defendants’ denials were 
groundless; their product, in essence a highly efficient nicotine delivery system, was 
manifestly designed to induce addiction – just as the plaintiffs’ trial experts said.  Having 
now seen for themselves the defendants’ product in action, what more could the jurors 
want?  Words alone could hardly offset the immediate and enduring impact that this kind 
of visual persuasion exerts on decision makers’ thinking and judgment.
Or consider again the criminal case that we also introduced at the outset of Part I.  
During the State of Connecticut’s closing argument in the trial of Michael Skakel for the 
murder, 27 years before, of 15-year-old Martha Moxley, jurors heard and saw Skakel’s 
own words appear on the screen before them.  As Skakel uttered the word “panic,” jurors 
instantly saw Martha Moxley’s lifeless body appear on the screen as it lay at the crime 
scene. Of course Skakel experienced a “feeling of panic” when Martha’s mother asked 
him the next morning if he had seen Martha the night before. The picture of Martha’s 
battered, lifeless body immediately explains the implicit meaning of his words. The 
viewer instantly makes the connection: Skakel, upon awakening, must have recalled with 
horror what he had done the night before. Because the screen-based emotional response
and the reality-based response are comparable, the viewer’s emotional reaction to the 
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picture of Moxley’s body is readily transferred to Skakel. The viewer “knows” what he 
is reacting to. And the viewer’s revulsion at what Skakel had done readily casts an image 
of guilt in the viewer’s mind. This instantaneous understanding elides the passage of 
time – between the murder and the morning after (in 1975), and between the time when 
Skakel uttered these words (in 1997) and the time that they were replayed at the trial 
itself (in 2002). Distance in time and space matters not, for everything takes place in the 
emotionally salient, temporally flattened now of viewing the screen. And because this 
understanding is immediate, credible, and seemingly complete, the viewer experiences 
little reason to question what he knows. The defense counsel’s purely verbal counter-
narrative87 is unlikely to explain Skakel’s panic as convincingly because it lacks the 
cognitive and emotional salience of the prosecution’s montage. Seeing is believing – or 
more precisely, belief is more solidly constructed through visual understanding prompted 
by visual displays. 
We have discussed how, as a function of brain physiology and sensory perception,
people construct their worlds – both their inner worlds and what they encode about the 
world outside.  We have also noted that visual perception and visual thinking do not 
occur in a vacuum, separated from other parts of mental life. Traditionally, pictures used 
in law have been conceived as mere illustrations of words.  We believe that a more 
sophisticated approach will better inform advocates’ choices about what and how much 
to show, and what and how much to tell. The conjunctions between pictures and other 
forms of communication and between visual and verbal thinking, however, also make it 
important to understand a little more about the various cognitive and narrative 
87
 The defense contended that when Skakel said he felt “panic” upon meeting Martha’s mother, he was 
thinking that he might have been seen masturbating in a tree outside Martha’s bedroom window the night 
before.  Connecticut v. Skakel, S.C. 16844 (Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, p. 60) (November 24, 2003). 
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frameworks that shape and inform legal advocacy.  It is to this topic, therefore, that we 
turn next.
(ii) Cognitive frameworks and narrative theory.    People’s beliefs and judgments 
may be more or less firmly tethered to perceived reality, but they always exceed it.  To 
understand a conversation, to make a prediction or to assign blame, people always do just 
what they do in response to pictures88:  They “go beyond the information given,” in 
Jerome Bruner’s famous phrase.89 That is, they interpret  and draw inferences from new 
data in light of their habits of thinking and feeling, their largely intuitive conceptions of
how the world works and how things go. 
Cognitive and social psychology help to identify and explain the stuff from which 
beliefs are made.  Psychology outlines the stereotypes which people use to classify and 
judge others; it uncovers the stock scripts that guide expectations about others’ behavior 
and tag deviations as worth accounting for.90  It describes how everyday cognition 
conserves scarce mental resources by using mental heuristics or rules of thumb to reach 
quick answers that are often good enough, but sometimes seriously mistaken.91
Psychology also shows how people’s emotions, while highly variable and seemingly 
irreducible to any empirical calculus, interact with their perceptions and cognitions to 
guide judgment and behavior.92  Other disciplines also strive to articulate the unspoken 
88 See supra note xx (on interpreting the “frame”).
89
 Jerome Bruner, Beyond the Information Given (1973).
90
 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (1990); Roger Schank & Robert Abelson, Scripts Plans Goals and 
Understanding (1977).
91 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, & The ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make 
Us Smart (1999)); Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn’t So (1991); Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, 
Human Inference:  Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980).
92 See, e.g., Damasio, supra note xx; Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Emotion and Social Judgments (1991); Joseph 
P. Forgas (ed.), Feeling and Thinking (2000).
26
grounds of comprehension and belief.  Studies in the philosophy of language, linguistics, 
and cultural anthropology, for instance, indicate the implicit understandings that people 
must share in order to make sense of one another’s words.93
Of the manifold ways in which humans organize and make sense of their 
experiences, none may be more important than narrative.  “It seems almost as if 
humankind is unable to get on without stories,” write Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome 
Bruner toward the beginning of their masterly discussion of the subject.94  Stories do 
much more than tell what happened, although that in itself is no small thing.  They “give 
comfort, inspire, provide insight; they forewarn, betray, reveal, legitimize, convince.  
You can declare your love by telling just the right story at the right time; you can be Iago 
and create mad suspicion; you can spur Billy Budd to strike Claggart dead.”95  A 
culture’s stories – recounted in religious scripture and popular novels, depicted in movies 
and on television, or enacted in video and computer games – present heroes, villains, and 
everyone in between confronting conflicts and one other, and thereby teach us, the 
audience, how we should feel and what we should do about our own and others’ 
comparable plights.  
Lawyers and law are, of course, immersed in stories, from the client’s first 
account of events in the lawyer’s office, to the versions the lawyers tell each other during 
settlement negotiations, to the narratives cons tructed for judge and jury at trial, to the 
accounts designed for television news and journalists in other mass media.  Each telling 
is molded as much by perceived audience expectations, conventions of genre and 
93 See, e.g., Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn (eds.), Cultural Models in Language and Thought (1987); 
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987).
94
 Amsterdam & Bruner, supra note xx, at 114. 
95 Id. at 115.
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professional practice, and constraints of time and medium as by correspondence to any 
unnarrated reality.  A persuasive legal story must be as consistent as possible not only 
with the evidence and the judge and jury’s understandings of the relevant law, but also 
with those audiences’ senses, developed through lifetimes of exposure to their culture, of 
“how stories like that go.”96
It is the choice of a particular story (and the mode of telling) as befits the 
circumstances that tends to capture legal belief and motivate audiences to take the action 
the advocate desires:  acquit or convict, award damages or deny recovery.  The story that 
works best may be as relatively mundane as a personal injury lawyer’s allusion to
Rocky97 to depict an accident victim struggling to overcome his undeserved suffering.98
Or it may be as transcendent as the story of the founders of the American polity, used by 
Gerry Spence to cast his white separatist client Randy Weaver as the heroic defender of 
Jeffersonian liberty against governmental tyranny.99
Or, drawing once again from one of the case examples offered earlier in Part I, 
consider the narrative strategy that Maxus’s lawyers developed for their case against 
Kidder, Peabody and Martin Siegel.100  The case, in a nutshell, was that Maxus, a 
company in the oil business, had hired prestigious New York investment banker Martin 
Siegel and his firm Kidder, Peabody to prepare the takeover of Natomas, another 
company.  But after each meeting Siegel held with Maxus officials, the price of 
96 See Pennington & Hastie, supra note xx.
97 Rocky (United Artists 1976).
98
 Neal R. Feigenson, “The Rhetoric of Torts:  How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, 
Reasonableness, and Responsibility,” 47 Hastings L. J. 61 (1995).
99
 Spence developed this narrative in response to the state’s claim that Weaver murdered a federal marshal 
who had come onto Weaver’s property to arrest him for unlawfully selling a sawed-off shotgun, months 
back, to an undercover agent who also (albeit unsuccessfully) had solicited Weaver’s services as a covert 
government agent.  Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop 56-58 (2000); see Gerry Spence, From 
Freedom to Slavery 1-48 (1995).
100 See Stachenfeld & Nicholson, supra note xx; see supra notes xx-xx and accompanying text.  
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Natomas’s shares went up.  Maxus claimed that Siegel had passed along inside 
information to Kidder executive Ivan Boesky, who then invested in the target company, 
driving up its stock prices, so that when Maxus eventually acquired Natomas it had to pay 
hundreds of millions of dollars more than it otherwise would have.  How to invoke the 
audience’s intuitive beliefs so as to convert a complex commercial dispute involving 
massive amounts of circumstantial evidence into a simple, credible, compelling story line 
that would point the jury to the desired verdict?
The solution was to visually emplot the case as a struggle between Us and Them, 
the familiar local guy versus the big bad Other – an archetypal conception of how conflict 
is structured, and who should win, that goes back to the biblical tale of David and 
Goliath.  Maxus’s closing argument video starts by locating the parties on a map of the 
United States.  Its disproportionate enlargement of Texas, shaped and colored to evoke 
the state’s highly popular flag, encouraged the Texan jurors to identify with a home-
grown plaintiff and, conversely, drawing on implicit social stereotypes, to distance 
themselves from the defendants – those “outsiders” from New York.  To enhance the 
effect, at one point jurors saw the state of Texas suddenly snap out of the graphic display 
as if it were shooting a line (or a lasso?) around New York.101 In short, the visual 
argument that Maxus’s lawyers used to construct the legal conflict deployed a story 
101 Notably, this visual feature of the map graphic reflects the video makers’ purposeful exploitation of a 
highly popular television commercial that had been receiving a good deal of air play at the time of the trial 
in Texas.  In the ad, cowboys around a campfire learn – much to their distress – that the salsa that they have 
been eating with their dinner wasn’t local (as was the advertised brand).  “Hmmm, made in New York
City,” the hapless cook reads from the salsa jar label.  “New York City?!!” cry the outraged cowboys in 
unison. “Get the rope!”  In the final scene, we see the cook lying hogtied beside the campfire with the 
cowboys now happily consuming what is presumably the proper local brand – the advertiser’s.  According 
to the designers of the Maxis visuals, the map graphic was meant to resonate with the salsa ad:  The image 
of Texas lassoing New York State invites a rapid, unconscious association to the TV ad’s irate cowboys 
“lassoing” the hapless cook for importing a “foreign” and manifestly undesirable product from New York.  
Stachenfeld & Nicholson, supra note xx, at 908-09.  For more on the role of popular culture in the 
generation of subconscious inferences and stereotypes, see infra notes xxx-xxx and accompanying text 
(Part II(iii)).   
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frame that anyone familiar with our culture’s core moral tales (or the local culture’s 
implicit folk knowledge) could immediately recognize and understand. Marty Siegel, the 
unscrupulous outsider, is recognizably the “bad guy” in a visually narrated scenario that 
manifestly prompts the jury’s sympathy and animosity along well-established lines.
(iii) Mediated belief:  Popular visual culture and reality judgments.  In 
contemporary culture, most people get their facts primarily from popular visual media.  
Television and the Internet provide more people with news about the world, as well as 
information about law and politics, than do traditional print media.102  Television’s photo-
realism, in particular, seems to open an audiovisual “window onto reality.”103  Yet “[t]he 
medium is the message,” as Marshall McLuhan famously proclaimed back in 1964.104
McLuhan’s critical insight was that we must disabuse ourselves of the naïve notion that 
the mass media operate like an empty pipe (or, in the case of television, like a window) 
through which information passes.  In fact, different media exert different kinds of 
influences on the messages they convey.  For example, print culture usually operates in a 
field of concepts and categories.105  Television, by contrast, excels in depicting personal 
dramas, offering viewers story lines and character types that are familiar and immediately 
accessible.  Television achieves unique emotional power and intimacy by way of the 
102
 Annys Shin, “Newspaper Circulation Continues to Decline,” BizReport, May 3, 2005, 
http://www.bizerport.com/news/8894/ (last visited August 18, 2005) (“The decline [in newspaper 
circulation in the six months ending March 31, 2005] continued a 20-year trend in the newspaper industry 
as people increasingly turn to other media such as the Internet and 24-hour cable news networks for 
information.”) 
103 E.g., W. James Potter, “Perceived Reality in Television Effects Research,” 32 J. Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media 23 (1988); Shapiro & MacDonald, supra note xx.
104
 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (1964).
105 See, e.g., Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy; cf. Susan Aylwin, “Imagery and Affect:  Big Questions, 
Little Answers,” in Hampson, Marks, & Richardson (eds.), supra note xx, at 247, 251 (“Verbal 
representation [in the mind] yields associations which indicate that it is specialized for representing 
hierarchical conceptual structures.”).
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close-up, which brings viewers directly into the emotional field of the characters on the 
screen.106  This is hardly a matter of mere aesthetics.  Dramatizing the personal tends to 
obscure the general.  By presenting social problems in terms of personal history and 
individual character development, television resists complexity, which is notoriously 
difficult to dramatize in visual form.107
People’s media-spawned expectations are guided by the visual codes not only of 
television but also film, especially major Hollywood movies.  The visual codes that come 
from popular culture become a part of people’s visual common sense, which is to say, 
they are unconsciously assimilated.  People understand cross cutting and parallel editing.  
They do not need anyone to explain these storytelling devices.  The camera is inside the 
audience’s heads, and they are prepared to reconstruct reality in accordance with the 
perceptual and cognitive codes they have internalized.   
People also generally suppose that they know reality when they see it, that they 
can, by and large, distinguish humbug from the genuine article.  They kick the tires and 
don’t take any wooden nickels.  And when people “suspend disbelief” to indulge in a 
novel, a film, or a television drama, they like to think they do so “willingly.”  Yet, 
considerable psychological research shows that it is not so easy to know what to believe, 
106
 The size of the television screen and its location in rooms small enough for it to be seen clearly, whether 
a living room or a bar, mean that close-ups are especially powerful because of the viewing distance as well 
as the intimacy of the medium.
107 See, e.g., W. Lance Bennett, News:  The Politics of Illusion 48-58 (3d ed. 1996). Other features of 
(commercial) television, such as the perceived need to entertain and the generally short time limits within 
which most news stories are presented, also contribute to the avoidance of complexity.  See, e.g., id. at 52-
64; Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985).  Conversely, print media coverage of social 
problems can also tend to oversimplify through dramatization.  See, e.g., Robert A. Stallings, “Media 
Discourse and the Social Construction of Risk,” 37 Soc. Probs. 80 (1990).  Note also, however, that 
television drama has become a longer, more complex form as viewers of series find themselves 
encountering characters over the weeks (and even years) of broadcast; series writers count on the audience 
knowing things about the characters from past scripts.  Cf. Steven Johnson, Everything Bad is Good for 
You:  How Today’s Popular Culture Is Actually Making Us Smarter (2005).  By comparison, the stories 
told in court may seem short and, because of hearsay rules, lacking in characterological detail.
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or when.  Credulity, not skepticism, is the default mode.  When people readily understand 
something they are inclined to believe it.108  Disbelief must be effortfully engaged; it is 
what people do when they critically assess what they have already provisionally accepted 
as true.109
The visual mass media provide people not only with most of their facts but also 
with most of their fictions.  Indeed, people’s world-knowledge draws upon a mixture of 
fictional and non-fictional sources,110 and they are not always able to differentiate real 
from fictional sources of remembered information.111 The striking irony is that facts can 
seem more “factual” the more like fiction they become.  This happens because people 
generally are less motivated to process fictional information systematically than factual 
information.112  When an audience unwittingly responds to a factual presentation as if it 
were fiction, the default mode – credulity – kicks in.  Critical analysis, not disbelief, gets 
suspended.  Effective critique requires not only knowledge of the requisite tools of 
critical analysis but also the energy and inclination to undertake it.  By contrast, stored-
away fictions effortlessly come to mind when a familiar narrative genre, or character or 
situation type, stimulates people’s recollection.  That is part of what is going on when a 
trial lawyer compares a witness or a defendant to a well-known character from The 
Godfather, Natural Born Killers, or The Sopranos.113  If the comparison sticks, the jury 
tends to fill in the rest of the story, including character traits unmentioned at trial, even if 
they are fictional.
108
 Daniel T. Gilbert, “How Mental Systems Believe,” 46 Am. Psychol. 107 (1991).
109
 Deborah A. Prentice, Richard J. Gerrig, & Daniel Bailis, “What Readers Bring to the Processing of 
Fictional Texts,” 4 Psychonomic Bull. & Rev. 416 (1997).
110
 Deborah A. Prentice & Richard J. Gerrig, “Exploring the Boundary Between Fiction and Reality,” in 
Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 529 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
111 E.g., Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, “Reality Monitoring,” 88 Psychol. Rev. 67 (1981).
112
 Prentice & Gerrig, supra note xxx, at 544.
113 See Sherwin, supra note xx [When Law Goes Pop], at 16-17.
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The codes and content of modern visual storytelling, from television dramas and 
news shows to advertisements and feature films, have infiltrated the courtroom, so that 
fact and fiction, information and entertainment, work hand in hand in the production of 
legal truth.  For example, a closing argument video in a lawsuit against Price Waterhouse, 
which at the time of the trial was the largest accounting firm in the world, begins with 
documentary shots of the largest ocean liner of its time, the reputedly unsinkable Titanic, 
which did indeed sink.  The video then seamlessly shifts to clips from A Night to 
Remember, the 1958 feature film about the Titanic in which indifferent officers and a 
preoccupied captain appear to recklessly disregard a telegram warning about the presence 
of icebergs in the ship’s vicinity.  The plaintiff’s visual summation then cross-cuts those 
clips with a stream of re-enactments and other scenes describing how the defendant sank 
the plaintiff’s takeover deal by carelessly failing to spot faulty loan practices by the bank 
the plaintiff acquired.114 The upshot is clear:  Being the largest in the world is no 
safeguard against negligence.
Or consider once again, this time from a popular cultural perspective, the Maxus 
insider trading case against Kidder, Peabody.  In the visual graphic used by plaintiffs in 
their closing argument, the jurors saw defendant Marty Siegel perched in a three-by-three 
grid reminiscent of the tic-tac-toe board featured in the once popular television game 
show, “The Hollywood Squares.”  When the nine Siegels are seen and heard 
simultaneously “taking the Fifth,” the effect is highly comical.  The viewer laughs at the 
incongruous sight of a once esteemed Wall Street investment banker cast in a TV game 
114
 The trial judge’s admission of this video was reversed on appeal.  Standard Chartered PLC v. Price 
Waterhouse, CV No. 88-34414 (Super. Ct., Maricopa Co., AZ, 1989), rev’d, 945 P.2d 317, 359 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1996).  See Sherwin, supra note xx [When Law Goes Pop], at 272 nn.39-40; Rorie Sherman, “And 
Now, the Power of Tape,” Nat’l L. J., February 8, 1993, p. A1.
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show that typically featured celebrity has-beens desperate to revitalize their careers (or at 
least make a buck).  That this response, and the normative associations that it carries, is 
being triggered by an iconic game show, however, remains implicit, unarticulated, and 
hence unavailable to critical reflection.  The humor on display is disarming, but there is a 
more serious intent at work here.  The visualization of the incanting Siegels diminishes 
him by implicitly portraying him as just another celebrity has-been,115 but it demonizes 
him as well.  The humorous gloss of Siegel ensconced in all nine squares distracts the 
decision maker from a legally impermissible inference that may also be taking place:  
namely, the association of Siegel with other so-called “Fifth Amendment criminals” who 
hide the truth of their misdeeds behind a wall of silence.  Of course, to say that this 
apparently innocuous visual display penalizes the defendant for exercising his
constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination not only seems 
counterintuitive from the standpoint of ordinary common sense (after all, the video clips 
accurately depict what Siegel said at his deposition), but also spoils the simple fun of the 
display.  In sum, the viewer gets the message because the visual code of a popular 
television game show icon is instantly recognizable, and the critical bite of an 
impermissible (albeit unconscious) inference remains hidden.  To preserve the joke the 
viewer is disinclined to analyze it critically.
To acknowledge that Maxus’s “Hollywood Squares” display constructs its visual 
argument in the form of a shrewd joke is to reassert one of the points we have been 
making:  This seemingly simple visual display is decidedly not a mere illustration of 
ideas that could just as well be expressed verbally.  To analyze its rhetoric, we have 
115
 It also diminishes him by reducing his appearance to a mere replicable unit (and impliedly, one that can 
be reproduced without limit).   
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drawn on the psychology of visual perception, the social psychology of mental 
frameworks, narrative theory, and the conflation of fact and fiction in contemporary 
culture and the human mind.  In the next section we add one more set of conceptual and 
rhetorical tools, an essential part of the multidisciplinary network of insights that lawyers 
need in order to understand law in the digital age. 
(iv)  Digital culture/digital mind. Good tools serve the purposes for which they 
were initially designed, but they also suggest additional, often unexpected uses and lead 
to new forms of understanding that inspire the building of yet other tools. Consider, for 
example, the computer mouse invented by Douglas Engelbart and his team at the 
Stanford Research Institute.  In 1968, they demonstrated a networked computer system
that had the rudiments of two- dimensional display editing, flexible view control, on-
screen video teleconferencing – and a mouse.116  Anyone using a computer now knows 
how to use a mouse to navigate and enter commands.  Forty years ago, however, these 
functions were not yet the highly developed technologies with which we are familiar 
today.  But they projected a vision of human-computer interaction that inspired 
innumerable subsequent innovations, from the graphical user interface (which permits 
people to use multiple applications at the same time) to full-fledged hypermedia.117  Just 
as those technical ideas were seeded in a professional community and eventually grew 
into unexpected, even astonishing fruit, exposure to and use of digital technologies is
already generating new behaviors and new patterns of thought in the law.
116 http://sloan.stanford.edu/mousesite/ (last visited July 6, 2005).
117
 They also prepared the ground for computer-mediated revampings of human relations a quarter-century 
before Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
World_Wide_Web (last visited July 6, 2005)).
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Advanced digital imaging capacities are now widely dispersed.118 In the past, a 
lawyer might order a graphic from a designer and have no real idea how it was made.  
Now that lawyer probably owns a digital camera and can upload and make simple edits 
(like cropping or adjusting the orientation or the contrast between light and dark).  Excel 
makes it easy to graph data; word processing programs make it easy to design pages and 
incorporate pictures and tables into texts.  Other readily available software allows people 
to lay out entire books and to create two-dimensional animations.  In short, what used to 
be the specialized knowledge of graphic designers using tools affordable only by those 
with professional commitments is now available to all computer users at consumer prices 
for use at home or at work, as freeware, or as software running on computers in schools,
libraries, and copy shops.
The same is true with respect to moving images.  Almost anyone can make them –
even still cameras and cell phones are now capable of making short video clips – and 
anyone can modify anything they or anyone else has made.119  Good hands and expensive 
tools are no longer needed.  Pointing and clicking have become physical habits; seeing 
118
 “Recent InfoTrends/CAP Ventures forecasts show that U.S. consumer digital camera penetration will 
reach 55% and shipments of around 25 million in 2005, growing to 81% and about 21 million units shipped 
in 2010.  Camera phone penetration will grow from 31% and just over 36 million units shipped to 86% and 
nearly 80 million units shipped over the same period.” http://www.infotrends-rgi.com/home/Press/itPress/
2005/6.21.05.html.
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 Apple, whose “Rip, Mix, Burn” ad campaign (see http://www.theapplecollection.com/Collection/ 
AppleMovies/mov/concert_144a.html (last visited July 6, 2005), gave the title to habits rapidly spreading 
through computer users because they are able to rip (copy), mix (reedit), and burn (put on a disk or other 
media) their own creations, has itself  now been subjected to a mixing of quite another kind. George 
Masters, a teacher who loves his i-Pod, made his own ad during after hours from work and posted it to his 
blog for comment. Viewership and downloads exploded and it wound up in Wired Magazine. See 
http://www.wired.com/news/mac/0,2125,66001,00. html.  What is a company to do when its customer 
speaks back in this way?
Or consider this digital visual information exchange:  After Baltimore drug dealers produced a 
DVD called “Stop Snitching,” in which they threatened to kill anyone who testified against them, the 
Baltimore Police Department responded with their own DVD, “Keep Talking,” which mentioned the arrests 
of three dealers featured in the gang’s video.  Gary Gately, “Police Counter Dealers’ DVD With One of 
Their Own,” N.Y. Times, May 11, 2005, at A.12.    
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pictures as potential material and not just as someone’s property is one of the new mental 
habits.  Repurposing other’s visual work is not something new.  Artists have been quoting 
each other and learning by copying from the beginning.  Now, however, it can be done 
with “original” digital data; anyone, even lawyers, can do it; and their art can be 
published on the Internet and disseminated globally at virtually no cost.
The ubiquity of surveillance and amateur video cameras in conjunction with a 
broad range of readily available and easy to use image-editing tools have given rise to 
many more kinds of demonstrative evidence.  This was  dramatically illustrated in the 
cases arising out of the New York Police Department’s mass arrests of protesters outside 
the 2004 Republican National Convention, in which dozens of amateur videos were 
introduced to refute (and in a few cases, to confirm) police claims that the protesters had 
behaved illegally.120  But the widespread experience of modifying and manipulating 
pictures has even deeper cultural and cognitive significance.  The typical lawyer may not 
be adept at using advanced professional editing software like Adobe Photoshop, but in all 
likelihood, he or she will have heard of “photoshopping” as a verb referring to altering a 
picture.121  This neologism expresses a dramatically altered relationship to the 
photograph.  Today, in an era when digital pictures are infinitely malleable, when, in the 
120
 Jim Dwyer, “Videos Challenge Hundreds of Convention Arrests,” N.Y. Times, April 12, 2005, at A1.  
Still more recently, Newark residents awakened by the sound of a car crash used the digital displays on 
their cell phones to determine that the police took twice as long to arrive at the accident scene as the police 
claimed (Jennifer Medina & John Holl, “3 People Die in Fierce Collision of 2 S.U.V.’s,” N.Y. Times, 
August 22, 2005, at B3).  Such events also exemplify the expanding role of digital communication 
technologies, including cell phones and video cameras, in political activism.  On this subject, see the 
documentary film by Katerina Cizek and Peter Wintonick, Seeing is Believing:  Handicams, Human Rights, 
and the News (2002).  On the political dislocations created by ubiquitous photoimaging in public spaces, 
see Ariella Azoulay, Death’s Showcase: The Power of Image in Contemporary Democracy 287 (2001).  
121 Adobe, like Xerox, is troubled by having its brand turned into a general neologism. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photoshop (last visited July 6, 2005).
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words of William Mitchell, “the referent has come unstuck,” 122 people may have to give 
up their naïve sense of the photorealistic picture as metonymic truth.123  In exchange, they 
will gain an understanding of the picture as a construct, a text124 to be actively construed 
rather than a window onto the world that merely needs to be looked through.125
So far we have addressed changes in the pictorial texts themselves.  The Internet 
has also profoundly changed people’s relationship to the screen on which those texts are 
seen.  On cinema screens, people became accustomed to seeing their dreams writ large
while sitting with others in a dark, cavernous room.  Television, by contrast, with its 
comparatively small screen, brought news of the world and entertainment into the 
intimate sphere of the household, becoming a character in family life, a familiar.
Personal computer screens differ from both.126 Unlike televisions, where groups can 
122
 Mitchell, supra note xx, at 31. For a thorough review of the changing status of the photograph as it 
moved from being an analog medium to a digital medium, readers might wish to read Mitchell’s entire 
chapter, which covers a variety of issues of legal interest. 
123
 Mitchell, supra note xx.
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 On pictures as texts, see supra note xx.
125 See Fred Ritchin, In Our Own Image:  The Coming Revolution in Photography 124 (1999) 
(“Photography, for 150 years basically a perceptual medium, can now become a largely conceptual one as 
well.”)
Legal “texts” in the more literal sense of the word are also problematized in the digital age, and in 
particular, in the age of the Internet.  The Internet is creating a new mass digital culture increasingly made 
up of hybrid texts – and hypertexts – which promote a different form of reading than, say, the traditional 
law book, where any graphic or pictorial material is comfortably situated as an illustration, encapsulated by 
its labeling.  A hybrid text, made of words and pictures (or other combinations of media), is what people 
see every time they open a browser to explore the World Wide Web.  Legal texts like statutes, judicial 
opinions, and law review articles have been online since the mid-1970s (F. Allan Hanson, “From Key 
Numbers to Keywords:  How Automation Has Transformed the Law,” 94 Law Lib. J. 563, 573 (2002)), 
and already come packaged with abstracts, hyperlinked cross-references, symbols coded to elicit different 
kinds of attention from readers, and various explanatory materials.  How will such texts be modified to 
accommodate the expectations of lawyers and a public who have internalized new habits of reading 
word/picture hybrids?  When a trial turns on the presentation of digital visual material, what will be the 
“official” text be?
126 The new screen that arrived with the personal computing revolution entered both workplaces and private 
spaces with unprecedented rapidity. In 1950, 8.8 percent of American households owned a television; by 
2005, 98 percent of households do.  Susan Ashworth, “TV Facts Then & Now,” Digital World, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,118945,00.asp, (February 2005).  This progression seems 
modest when compared to similar statistics for the World Wide Web.  Before the Web was a public space, 
in 1969, there were about eight hosting servers.  In 2005 the number of servers is approaching one billion
(Robert H. Zakon, “Hobbes’ Internet Timeline,” “Hosts”, http://ww.zakon.org/Robert/internet/timeline (last 
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gather around for common experience and comment, personal computers are more often 
in places where people use them alone, and their interactions with others are through the 
machine rather than across the table or down the couch. However, people also respond to 
what they see on screens in many ways that are similar to how they respond to social 
encounters in real life.127 And at the same time, people expect to do things, to be 
engaged, with what they see on the screen.128
Participating in mediated digital environments is, of course, what computer 
gaming is all about.  Multiplayer on-line games such as “Second Life” provide complete 
social environments for their participants.129  Successful play, moreover, involves not just 
interacting with other players within a framework of rules and protocols, but remaking 
one’s digital world by reprogramming it.  Increasingly, prospective jurors (and not only 
younger ones) may come to court with the expectation not only that witnesses and 
lawyers will navigate multimedia presentations via pointing and clicking (as in the Skakel 
case), but also that they will themselves be allowed to participate in the recreation of 
legal reality.
Lawyers are already beginning to cater to people’s expectation that, in the digital 
era, information is something that they can and should be able to seek out and interact 
with rather than something that they passively receive.  Consider the virtual reality view, 
visited March 6, 2005), and the number of web sites, one hundred million. The number of users of the
Internet, a prior creation that enables the existence of the World Wide Web, doubled every one hundred 
days between 1994 and 1997. Some comparisons:  it took thirty-eight years for radio to reach fifty million 
listeners; television took thirteen years, and the Internet only four (“The Exponential Growth of the 
Internet,” http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/ academics/dri/011/growth.html) (citing U.S. Department of 
Commerce statistics).
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 Byron Reeves & Clifford Nass, The Media Equation (1996).
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 Indeed, for some the engagement with the machine and the virtual worlds it yields can become an 
obsession; see, e.g., Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen (1995).  Note that this interactivity is not confined to 
computer screens; digital technology in the form of movies on DVD has made it possible for viewers to 
interact as never before with what they see on their television screens.
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a seamless, 360-degree representation of a scene compositcd from digital or digitized 
photographs.  Users navigate the scene, moving in any direction and zooming in or out as 
desired.  American lawyers have used virtual reality views in a handful of cases as 
illustrative aids to clarify eyewitness testimony.130 Across the Atlantic, an even more 
complex “virtual reality system” has been used by witnesses before the Bloody Sunday 
Tribunal, established in 1998 to reexamine the facts of the 1972 killing of thirteen Irish 
citizens by British soldiers in the streets of Derry.  Interacting with computer-generated 
views of various locations in Derry, witnesses have been able to revisit scenes from any 
angle and draw arrows on the screen to describe the events and movements they recalled.  
In some instances the virtual reality system has enabled the Tribunal to confirm that it 
was physically possible for witnesses to have seen what they remembered seeing, given 
the layout of the city and the witnesses’ locations at the time.131
Or consider the Soham double homicide case in Great Britain.  The defendant 
stood accused of the murder of two young girls.132  The government’s case was 
circumstantial.  At its heart were the sweater fibers from the clothing worn by the two 
young female victims at the time of their disappearance and death.  The jurors not only 
got to see those fibers in open court; the judge also gave the m a DVD to play during their 
deliberations.133  As a result, in the course of reconstructing for themselves the story of 
the case, the jurors were able to move freely among the digital evidence contained on the 
disc, which included images of the fibers, the sweaters they came from, the crime scene, 
130
 E-mail from Brian Carney, President, WIN Interactive, to Neal Feigenson (February 8, 2005) (on file 
with author).
131
 The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk (visited August 1, 2005); see 
also Bennett, supra note xx; Whelan, supra note xx.
132
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/3243025.stm.
133 The prosecution team considered 6,820 statements, 7,341 exhibits and hundreds of hours of video 
footage and media coverage. The police enquiry generated approximately 24,000 documents.
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/139_03.html.
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the girls’ route home, videotaped witness testimony, and other evidentiary material.  This
kind of free-ranging interactivity with digital evidence may foreshadow how legal 
meanings will be made in the digital era. Lawyers may have to rethink their rhetorical 
strategies, making space for their audiences to enter, and allowing them to feel that they 
are helping to construct the case along with counsel.134
Re-envisioning legal theory in the digital age turns our attention both to new 
sources of meaning and to new meaning-making practices.  Nearly a quarter of a century 
ago, Robert Cover wrote:
We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe. We constantly create 
and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful . . 
. . No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning.  For every constitution 
there is an epic, for each Decalogue a scripture. Once understood 
in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes 
not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which 
we live.135
134
 In this essay we have largely assumed the continuation of current legal procedures, but of course it is 
possible that the digital visual turn will lead to radical changes in those procedures; see, e.g., Gordon 
Bermant, “Courting the Virtual:  Federal Courts in an Age of Complete Interconnectedness,” 25 Ohio N.U. 
L. Rev. 527 (1999) (discussing virtual proceedings); Paul D. Carrington, “Virtual Civil Litigation:  A Visit 
to John Bunyan’s Celestial City,” 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1516 (1998) (describing trials consisting entirely of 
previously prepared digital visual presentations, in which “trial advocacy will more closely resemble the 
work of the Hollywood film producer and less that of the Hollywood actor”(id. at 1524)). 
135 Robert M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,”  97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 (1983).
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Law is a world in which we live. But to live in a nomos we need a corpus of 
inherited texts and a common set of interpretive practices. Out of these materials and 
practices we sustain and revise institutions, paradigms for behavior, and patterns of 
discourse. A stable society agrees upon (at least to a significant extent, although not 
without controversy and debate136) a shared repertoire of moves, “a lexicon of normative 
action,” 137 that it recombines and supplements to meet the needs of changing times.
The specific challenge that we face today is to translate, under new cultural and 
technological conditions, the complexity of multidisciplinary discourse into legal rhetoric 
and practice within the specific constraints and demands of legal argumentation. To 
accomplish this task we need a toolkit for cultural description and analysis, and for 
effective argumentation and legal problem solving.  That is what our constructivist 
approach is intended to offer.
This approach has multiple roots, including legal realism, legal pragmatism, 
critical legal studies, law and literature, law and norms theory, and the more recent genre 
of cultural legal studies.138  A common denominator among these diverse approaches to 
legal studies is multidisciplinarity.  Notably, cultural studies, out of which the cultural 
136 See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 133-72 (describing the notion of an “overlapping 
consensus” whereby people may disagree on particulars but reach consensus at a higher level of 
abstraction); see also Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice and the Liberal State 358-59 (1980); Emile 
Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy 92 (1974) (noting that “ideals could not survive if they were not 
periodically revived” through religious or secular feasts and ceremonies); Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, 
and Metaphors 50-56 (1974) (on the ritualized renewal of social meaning and deep cultural values through 
the performative dialectic of “social structures” and “communitas”).
137 Cover, supra note xxx, at 9. See also Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture xiv, xxvi
(1939) (“[T]he basis of education is a general consciousness of the values which govern human life. . . . 
The Greek trinity of poet, statesman, and sage embodied the state’s highest ideal of leadership.”).
138 See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties (1998); Paul W. Kahn, The 
Cultural Study of Law (1999); Law and the Order of Culture (Robert Post ed., 1991); Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Kearns, Law in the Domains of Culture (1998); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, “The 
Critical Use of History:  Cultural Criticism of Law,” 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1149 (1997); Susan S. Silbey, 
“Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law,” 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 39 (1992); Symposium, “A New 
Legal Realism?  Cultural Studies and the Law,” 3 Yale J. L. & Hum. 3 (2001).    
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legal studies movement emerged, has been providing scholars outside the legal academy 
with interdisciplinary tools since the late 1970s.139 Cultural studies focuses on the 
production, circulation, and assimilation of symbolic forms. It is largely concerned with 
how institutions and local practices generate social meanings.140
Cultural legal studies adopts this focus, seeking to go beyond appellate case law, 
statutory interpretation, and social policy, the dominant topics of law teaching and 
academic writing, in order to more broadly encompass legal meaning making practices 
throughout society.141 Simply stated, the central question that cultural legal studies asks 
is:  What are the popular cultural codes, the familiar schemas and scripts, the common 
vocabularies of motive and intentionality, and the hierarchy of beliefs and values that are 
in play within a given site of legal conflict? As Barbara Yngvesson has written, “[t]he 
spirit of law isn’t just invented at the top, but is transformed, challenged and reinvented 
in local practices that produce a plural legal culture in contemporary America.”142
Whether it is starting rumor campaigns to contest corporate control over cultural 
symbols,143 getting a court clerk to admit a story of abuse as a legal claim,144 or resisting 
mediators who construct images of problems in therapeutic as opposed to legal terms,145
these practices at the local level constitute the “microphysics of power” (to use a 
Foucauldian phrase).  Cultural legal studies’ multidisciplinary microanalyses of concrete 
legal practices counterbalance, without eradicating the need for, critical theory. By 
139 Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis (1978); Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture
(1980).
140
 Terence Turner, “Anthropology and Multiculturalism:  What is Anthropology that Multiculturalists 
Should be Mindful of It?,” 8 Cultural Anthropology 411 (1993).
141 Sherwin, supra note xx, at xxx.
142
 Barbara Yngvesson, “Inventing Law in Local Settings:  Rethinking Popular Legal Culture,” 98 Yale L. 
J. 1689 (1989).
143
 Coombe, supra note xxx.
144
 Yngvesson, supra note xxx.
145 Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, “Mediator Settlement Strategies,” 8 Law & Pol’y 7 (1986).
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proffering localized strategies of rhetorical affirmation and belief they complement the 
prevailing ethos of suspicion that marked (and ultimately undercut) critical legal studies.
The constructivist approach that we have outlined in this essay extends prior 
theory in several directions. First, we invite an even more broadly interdisciplinary (and 
thus arguably more fully pragmatic) method.  The cluster of conceptual tools that we 
have discussed and applied above is merely illustrative of a much more comprehensive 
lawyer’s toolkit, a yet-to-be-written rhetorical handbook for the digital age.  Second, we 
expand the search for the constitutive elements of legal consciousness – which is to say,
the cultural materials out of which legal meanings are shaped, disseminated, and 
absorbed – to explicitly encompass the quotidian world of graphic design, film, 
television, and the Internet, among other digital and multimedia resources.  Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, we urge the study, from multiple perspectives and with an eye 
toward their theoretical, pragmatic, and pedagogical ramifications, of the manifestations 
of legal consciousness in the visual and digital media that have come to pervade the 
practice of law.
With the ascendancy of electronic monitors inside the courtroom and out, 
students, teachers, and practitioners of law must be able to account for the everyday 
associations that decision makers bring to the screen. They must also be able to
accommodate the familiar programs and information schemas that viewers absorb from 
computers at home and in the office. By the same token, they will also need to come to 
grips with changing expectations among decision makers who have grown accustomed to 
surfing screen data for themselves. As computer users internalize the thinking tools 
provided by software in conjunction with Internet-bred habits of data searching via free 
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association, adjustments may be needed in legal communication and advocacy. In short, 
legal education must adapt to the contingencies of technology and the emerging 
vernacular of digital culture and the digital mind.146 We therefore turn to that part of our 
approach which addresses the study of law in a visual and digital culture.
Part III:  Re-envisioning Legal Education
To be prepared to enter the new landscape of professional practice, law students 
have to do far more than become acquainted with the new visual technologies being used 
in the law today.  They need to understand how new (and more established) visual 
technologies change the ways that their users and their audiences think.  They need to 
develop a critical visual intelligence that enables them to anticipate the cognitive and 
emotional effects of visual and multimedia displays and to respond to their adversaries’ 
visual and multimedia presentations. They need to become conversant with the expanded 
toolkit of conceptual and technological resources that we have described above, not 
simply in order to communicate and persuade more effectively, but also because this
multidisciplinary toolkit is precisely what will inform their appreciation of how visual 
displays can affect legal thinking, judgment, and meaning-making as a whole .  In short, 
they need to become visually literate.
Since 2000, the authors of this essay have been teaching a course that introduces 
upper-level law students to the knowledge and skills needed to practice law in the digital 
146 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note xx.
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age.147 We believe that the pedagogic vision behind our course is suggestive of what 
needs to be undertaken to bring law teaching into the digital multimedia age.
At its core, visual literacy means being able to identify the meanings that pictures
leave unsaid and to translate those perceptions into words.  We provide our students with 
a conceptual frame consisting of the interdisciplinary approach described in Part II, but 
we do not simply present bodies of knowledge and expect our students to apply that 
knowledge to legal visual displays.  Visual literacy cannot be learned from a handbook.
It is a matter of connoisseurship. Students must become conscious of their own 
responses to pictures, attend to others’ responses, and discern the cultural meanings that 
are circulated when a picture is understood to refer implicitly to other pictures, other 
words, and other media.
Students can develop these skills only through experience in interpreting and 
making visual displays. When students are provided with many opportunities to interpret 
visual displays, they not only become conscious of their own responses but also learn 
how to articulate those responses so as to make them accessible to others.  And just as 
writing is taught along with reading, so making visual arguments is as critical as 
interpretation to the development of visual literacy.  Only by making pictures can 
students understand the range of visual (and verbal) rhetorical choices available to them, 
and when they do, they are no longer held captive by the idea of the legal picture as mere 
illustration or metonym for reality.  Instead, they grasp it as a construction, their 
147
 For a more detailed discussion of the course we teach, see Christina O. Spiesel, Richard K. Sherwin, & 
Neal Feigenson, “Law in the Age of Images:  The Challenge of Visual Literacy,” in Contemporary Issues 
of the Semiotics of Law 231 (Anne Wagner, Tracy Summerfield, & Farid Benavides eds., 2005).  We have 
also been teaching workshops to practicing lawyers that are guided by the same pedagogic ideas.
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construction, suitable for reframing as desired within the context of their case strategy, 
informed by the multidisciplinary toolkit we provide.  
Law students come to law school with a readiness for this kind of instruction.  
Almost all enter with extensive experience in watching:  They have been going to the 
movies, watching television, playing video games on their PCs or gaming hardware, and 
surfing the Web.  Some have even been going to museums and galleries to see art.  They 
have acquired detailed knowledge of the visual codes embedded in these cultural 
products.  But they have rarely been asked to discuss their own responses.  Their 
knowledge is unavailable to them because it has largely been unexamined.
The combination of interpreting and making that students need to hone their 
responses to legal visual displays is not likely to have been cultivated in their previous 
education.  Even if they have studied art history, they have most likely simply studied the 
views of authorities on the works under scrutiny rather than articulating their own 
responses.148  Moreover, art history and cultural studies as academic subjects rarely 
provide any experiences in making visual things. The arts curricula that stress making 
things, on the other hand, are by and large aimed at training future professional artists.  
They are organized to produce a progressive development of certain technical skills 
instead of the viewing and thinking habits that lawyers need in their own professional 
practice:  the ability to respond intelligently to pictures in the moment, relying on their 
own judgment rather than on “authoritative” readings by others.149
148
 Art history itself has had difficulty in embracing the large expanse of visual culture outside of the 
masterworks that are part of the Western canon – cultural studies has taken up that slack – although that has 
been changing in the last twenty years or so.  See, e.g., Elkins, supra note xx; David Freedberg, The Power 
of Images (1989); Caroline A. Jones & Peter Galison (eds.), Picturing Science, Producing Art (1998).
149
 Practicing lawyers rarely have time to research the pictures that they and others make, and in any event, 
most legal visuals are one-of-a-kind pictures, made for the occasion and lacking any critical bibliography.  
So lawyers must be prepared to exercise their own judgment under time pressure rather than to rely on 
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Becoming receptive to the range of responses that people have to pictures, thereby 
discovering the ways in which different people’s responses might overlap and identifying 
the elements in the picture that provoke those responses, may seem to parallel on the 
level of pictures the verbal thinking habits that Richard Fischel and Jeremy Paul examine 
in Getting to Maybe,150 their study of how law students can best learn to think like 
lawyers. There is, however, a big difference between the discipline of words in legal 
education and the sporulation of pictorial meaning.  The traditional inputs of legal 
education – casebooks, other texts, and the authoritative speech of the professor – are all 
verbal, as are the traditional outputs:  the student’s understanding as expressed in 
classroom discussion, exams, and other written work.  Even if one agrees with Elizabeth 
Mertz151 that much of legal education consists in mastering new ways of reading, the 
fundamental problem for law students studying responses to pictures (or their own 
internal mental imagery) is, as we have observed, that they must be translated into words 
to become socially available.  And in that translation there is always a slippage, a loss of 
data.   
To prevent this slippage while fostering students’ abilities to recognize and 
articulate their engagement with pictures, the classroom must be reconfigured.  Our 
pedagogic toolkit, like the conceptual toolkit described in Part II above, is varied.152  We 
authoritative readings – quite different from the discipline of art history or, for that matter, from the legal 
convention of arguing from precedent.
150 Richard Michael Fischl & Jeremy Paul, Getting to Maybe (1999). 
151 Elizabeth Mertz, Recontextualization As Socialization: Text and Pragmatics in the Law School 
Classroom (1993),
152
 The idea of the pedagogic toolkit is anticipated by James Eagar, “The Right tool for the Job: The 
effective use of Pedagogical Methods in Legal Education,” 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 389 (1996-1997).  There is 
enough discussion in the academy these days about legal pedagogy to have generated a ninety-nine page 
bibliography just on specific classroom methodologies with fairly restrictive selection criteria.  Arturo 
López Torres & Mary Kay Lundwall, “Moving Beyond Langdell II: An Annotated Bibliography of
Current Methods for Law Teaching,”35 Gonz. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
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incorporate many features of traditional doctrinal and clinical teaching methods but 
combine them in new ways and modify them to suit the overall goal of developing visual 
literacy.  For instance, as in the traditional Socratic method, we ordinarily launch 
discussion and analysis by posing questions; unlike that method as usually practiced,
however, we do not argue with the responses to pictures that students offer.  Responses to 
pictures are not arguable in the same way that responses to legal texts are.  Absent an 
extensive tradition of critical interpretation and without readings that have been applied 
over time, there can be no appeal to more authoritative texts or to any consensus of 
scholars.153  As in the problem method, we create hypothetical cases as the context for the 
students’ major course projects; the cases require them to use a variety of legal sources as 
well as diverse background materials, and they are expected to identify and explore issues 
just as they would in a traditional law school class.  What they spot, however, is as likely 
to be a communicative or rhetorical issue as a strictly legal one.  As in the simulation 
method, students are expected to do a version of actual legal work (making a piece of 
demonstrative evidence or a visual final argument, respectively), but instead of engaging 
in a full role-play (e.g., performing a negotiation or portion of a mock trial), students step 
out of role and explain to their classmates their rhetorical choices, the thinking behind the 
visuals they constructed.154  Relatedly, although students do see examples of professional 
153
 A fortiori, we rarely lecture because it tends to make students passive in relation to the material and, 
unlike other subjects, there are no textbooks or treatises for the students to fall back on to learn what they 
need to about visual thinking.  
154
 An important benefit in taking students out of role (and a fortiori, in not converting the course to a 
clinical experience in which students represent real clients in real matters) is that much of the learning 
occurs when student work goes well beyond the bounds of admissibility (even granted that the admissibility 
of visual displays for which a proper foundation has been laid is frequently an open-ended judgment call, 
requiring the court to balance probative value against risk of prejudice and confusion under Fed. R. Evid. 
403 or the state law equivalent).  Rather than being an occasion for a poor grade, such work often prompts 
the most productive kind of discussion:  Why would the display probably not be admissible in court?  What 
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legal visuals used in actual cases, it is their own work (on major course projects and 
several smaller visual exercises) that provides the primary picture texts for classroom 
response and discussion.155  Finally, we do not use pre-designed legal instruction 
software packages.  Students’ only instruction in technology per se arises from their use 
of it to realize their ideas in their own projects.156  In the course of their work, they 
discover what software like PowerPoint lets them do and what it does not; they become 
aware of the software’s implicit point of view in dialogue with their own rhetorical goals.  
In a visual literacy class, if the professor tries to constrain the meaning of pictures 
(or picture-making technologies) for the student, the game is lost.  Students will be 
unwilling to share their perceptions and will not have the opportunity to hear the variety 
of responses that is so crucial to their learning experience.  The alternative to professorial 
control, however, is not the overturning of the entire methodology of legal education.  It 
is to redesign the classroom on the model of the focus group.  In focus groups, student-
participants share their own responses to pictures, share speculations on how meanings 
might shift with subtle changes in the picture, and discuss the picture’s intended 
audience(s).  The aim is not to train design professionals.  It is to train future lawyers who 
will know to pay attention to all of the elements that visual media put in play and who 
will be much better at strategizing and designing their cases by thinking visually and, 
was the student attempting to accomplish with that display, and how might the student achieve the same 
rhetorical goals while staying within the limits of admissibility?
155
 Eagar, supra note xxx, at 411-12, writes that audio-visual materials are likely to be welcomed as 
supplements to the classroom materials, but he envisions them as being brought in by the professor as part 
of the lecture or discussion planning – once again, a top-down approach.  
156
 To bring students up to speed on the advanced digital video editing software (Final Cut Pro or Premiere) 
that they use to create their final projects (closing argument videos), we provide individual workshops that 
cover only the simplest aspects of editing; any other guidance we offer is in response to students’ own 
requests for assistance in realizing their own editing ideas.  We do not impose any overall approach to the 
software.   
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when desired, at using the services of design professionals to accomplish their goals.157
Practice in working in collaborative environments will also enhance students’ readiness 
for the legal workplace, where they will often work with teams of lawyers, staff, and
(sometimes) legal consultants.158
In sum, we contend that when it comes to visual literacy and persuasion the 
structure of authority in the classroom must change.  It must be decentered in order to 
facilitate a creative process that works more from the bottom up (and out) than from the 
top down.  The growing use of new visual technologies even in traditional classrooms is 
readying the ground for this change.  While law students still use colored marking pens to 
analyze their study materials,159 and will probably continue to do so because such visual 
mapping is useful, they will soon be reading hybrid texts where they move from time-
based linear thinking (i.e., one word unfolding after another) to visual collages in which 
meanings are laid out spatially as well as temporally and the cues to reading those 
meanings are very different.160  Students already do something like this when a professor 
157
 All of the legal visual professionals with whom we have spoken have testified that it is much better to 
think about visualizing the case as the case is developed rather than to think about visuals later as add-ons 
to a verbally developed strategy.  These comments come partly from the designer’s understanding that the 
thinking in the design can help the thinking with the case, even suggesting avenues of investigation, and 
also from the knowledge that a compelling design can take time to develop.  See supra text accompanying 
note xx.
158
 Without quarreling with the conclusions of the MacCrate Report (Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions 
to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass’n, Legal Education and Professional Development – An Educational Continuum
(1992)), we observe that the Report simply does not address the kinds of concerns we have raised in this 
essay.  Visual literacy might well be included among the practical skills that the authors of the Report 
enumerated, but it is (as we hope to have shown) an entirely distinct skill set.  Moreover, issues of 
professionalism, ethics, and other topics that the Report addresses play out in distinctive ways in the 
context of visual communication and advocacy.
159
 Robert H. Miller, Law School Confidential (2004); Scott Turow, One L (1977). 
160
 Many law students already do this during class, but not entirely with regard to the class’s ostensible 
subject matter (much to the chagrin of some professors; see, e.g., John Schwartz, “Professors Vie with Web 
for Class’s Attention,” N.Y. Times, January 2, 2003, at A1):  They scan online news, IM their classmates, 
and play games while sometimes also scrolling through class notes and case briefs in an attempt to maintain 
sufficient contact with the professor’s presentation.  One goal for law teachers is to capture more of 
students’ technological savvy and viewing and reading habits and redirect them toward the course subject 
matter.  See also supra note xxx (hybrid legal texts).    
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projects a transparency or PowerPoint graphic, or charts a legal transaction with a marker 
on a whiteboard; they attend to the spoken words of the lecture while reading the graphic 
representation and writing their own notes. We suggest that students will do this even 
more frequently without the participation of a professor’s voice to organize the 
relationships.  The visual and digital turns combine in transforming the process of 
education into something more (inter)active, placing more responsibility on the student to 
seek out and reconfigure the words and pictures needed to accomplish the task at hand.
Discussions of vision, visuality, and visual culture abound in the non-legal
academy today,161 but tend to miss the point that pictures are not just about aesthetics.  
People outside the law school environment who learn of our teaching often remark, “Oh, 
you are teaching art to law students.”  The answer to that is a resounding no.  We are 
teaching visual thinking and visual rhetoric; we are teaching about visual texts and how 
they can be used to convey information as well as arguments.  We teach how lawyers can 
deploy visual culture as well as verbal culture to make their points.  That people respond 
as they do betrays a confusion – that picturing can be thought of only as art itself, 
opening the door to forbidden pleasures in the severe realm of the law.  To the contrary, 
lawyers and law students need to understand that making pictures, just like writing, can 
be an effort to think aloud162 or to communicate for specific purposes.  Picturing, like 
speaking or writing, is performative,163 and recognizing that is especially crucial in law,
where justice depends on the rhetoric lawyers deploy to persuade judges and juries. 
161
 Readers interested in sampling the rich literature in this area might enjoy Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), The 
Visual Culture Reader (1998).  The authors recently participated in the first International Conference on 
Visual Literacy, held at University College, Cork, Ireland on April 14-15, 2005; a conference and 
exhibition volume, to be edited by James Elkins, is forthcoming.  
162 See supra text following note xx.
163 See J. L. Austin, supra note xx.
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Our pedagogy, like our overall approach to the role of visuals in law, implicates 
the complex relationship between words and pictures throughout our culture’s history.  
This topic is dense because of the enduring and ever-changing contest between the two 
modalities,164 and because of ambiguity in the meaning of “to see” that goes all the way 
back to the Greek opposition of “insight” to perception, generally to the denigration of 
the latter.165  Space limitations prohibit us from doing more here than simply taking note 
of this rich historical subject.  Our ambition is limited to the hope that we have shown 
how words and pictures can be understood as complementary ways of talking about and 
doing things in the world, and how law students can be given the experiences from which 
that understanding can be cultivated further.  As the world of law, both in and out of 
court, is increasingly made available through visually designed digital environments –
texts subsumed within framing pictures, displayed on electronic screens – this 
understanding becomes more necessary than ever.
Part IV:  The Challenges Ahead
The meanings that hold a world together must be actively experienced, 
performed, and thereby re-enacted, at least on occasion, so that the wellsprings of 
commitment may be refreshed. This meaning making and meaning conserving process is 
the primary function of law.  As James Boyd White has written, law is best understood as 
a constitutive rhetoric: 
164 See Mitchell, supra note xx.
165
 For an incisive discussion of this and anti-ocularism in contemporary thought generally, see Martin Jay, 
Downcast Eyes:  The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (1994). 
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The law establishes roles and relations and voices, and it gives us 
as speakers the materials and methods of a discourse.  It is a way 
of creating a rhetorical community over time.  It is this discourse, 
working in the social context of its own creation, this language in 
the fullest sense of the term, that is the law.  It makes us members 
of a common world. 166
We believe that this constructivist (“rhetorical”) model of law remains apt, in both 
theory and practice.167  Its emphasis on “talk” and the written word, however, needs to be 
updated.  The domain of legal discourse must be expanded to include the digital capacity 
to generate, alter, and disseminate visual representations on the screen. And the study of 
law as a constitutive rhetoric must now encompass the various ways in which this digital 
capacity affects the legal meaning making process. In what ways has the conflict of 
interpretations, that mainstay of the common law tradition, been recast by the advent of 
digital technology? 
In our view, retooling the legal mind so that it may be better adapted to function 
effectively in a legal (and popular) culture transformed by new communication 
technologies constitutes the most pressing challenge before the legal academy today. The 
task is to make sense of the nature and practice of law in a non-essentialist, screen-
dominated, and pervasively visual environment. What kinds of knowledge and meaning 
are created, and with what outcomes, when they are visually and digitally constructed in 
particular ways? And what are the implications for the search for truth and the perennial 
166
 White, supra note xx, at 266.
167
 For a brilliant defense of law as constitutive rhetoric, see Anthony Kronman, “On Rhetoric,” 67 U. Cinn. 
L. Rev. 677 (1999).
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clashes between knowledge and eloquence, rational dialectics and rhetoric, ethical 
obligation and aesthetic pleasure (aesthesis), and belief and disenchantment in the current 
digital age?168
For example, as more people, practiced in the techniques of digital production, 
come to realize the manifold ways in which perceived realities may be constructed or 
changed, a new skepticism may emerge.  Will people sense ever-greater disjunctions 
between representations and reality, and if so, how will legal advocates reassert the 
authority of truth claims?  Conversely, how will law in the age of digital visual displays
cope with the mind’s default capacity for acceptance and belief?169 Will new levels of 
visual and media literacy meet the demands of critically confronting persuasive images 
on the screen? Or will the digital engineering of belief and judgment tighten its grip on 
the mind?170  Will people’s capacity to distinguish between fiction and reality simply 
diminish?171
As legal scholars pursue the interpenetrations of law and culture in the digital and 
visual era, basic questions about the continued vitality of democratic principles are bound 
to emerge with new vigor.  Lawyers’ increasing use of visual and multimedia displays
may have a profound democratizing effect.  Complex events and relationships and their 
168
 Our focus in this article has been on pictures and images in law that create challenges for decision 
making, judgment, and belief in legal theory and practice.  There is a small but growing literature that 
explores what pictures of the law reveal about how the law is regarded at the time the pictures are 
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legal significances may become more, not less, intelligible to attentive jurors and the 
public, reducing the appeal of verbal obfuscations.  Finders of fact may become more 
fully engaged in thinking through the issues if they understand the evidence better.  And 
as access to and familiarity with the means of visual production become more 
widespread, the power to make and disseminate images and thus to participate in the 
creation of cultural meanings, legal and otherwise, will also be more widely shared.172
Or the prospects for a legal culture in which visual rhetoric predominates may be 
less sanguine.  Contemporary advertising, “the most successful rhetorical enterprise on 
the planet,”173 has been described as what Aristotle labeled epideictic rhetoric.174  Unlike 
deliberative and forensic rhetorics, the traditional province of lawyers, epideictic rhetoric 
does not set forth propositional arguments building logically to a conclusion, but instead 
aims to move the audience to reaffirm common values they are all presumed to share.  In 
the case of product advertising, the values are those particular ones with which the 
advertiser hopes to associate the product, as well as the more general value of happiness-
through-consumption, implicated with a quasi-religious confidence.175  Political 
campaign films, similarly, may celebrate “tradition, hope, productivity, defense, 
patriotism, innocence” or any number of other presumably shared values, evoking these 
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values through imagistic, associational logic.176  To be sure, skillful legal advocates have 
always engaged in epideictic discourse as well:  Recall, for instance, Gerry Spence’s 
celebrations of individual freedom in the face of government tyranny as a way to 
persuade Ruby Ridge jurors to acquit his client.177  But what happens if, through 
increasing use of pictures and associational logic, legal discourse takes on even more of 
the character of epideictic rhetoric – at the expense of logic and critical analysis?  Will 
the consequence for legal argument (not to mention public discourse as a whole) be a 
decline in rational deliberation and decision making or simply a shift in the conventional 
criteria for proof and persuasion? We do not yet know the answers to these questions, 
but we believe that the questions must be asked.
To what extent will the power that attaches to legal meanings stream down from 
an elite group of culture producers, and to what extent will it percolate up and out from 
the needs, desires, and imaginings of the public at large? The answer to this used to be 
relatively simple:  Those with power were able to exercise significant control. The 
Internet has changed this dynamic.  The story of Marcus Arnold, the 15-year-old who 
became the Internet’s highest-rated legal advice giver, provides an intriguing, albeit 
inconclusive, indicator. 178  Marcus believed that he had learned enough law from 
watching television to give legal advice without conducting actual research. Notably, 
after his age and modus operandi became known, his popularity was undiminished.  Is 
this a tribute to Marcus’s communicative skills (as well as a slap at the profession’s 
communicative failings)? Does it portend the ascendancy of a populist (“know-nothing”) 
legal culture which operates to the detriment of counterintuitive legal expertise? Again, 
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these are the sorts of questions that we believe legal scholars and lawyers, practicing and 
aspiring, ought to be asking.  We count among the virtues of the pedagogy that we 
described earlier its capacity to help make law students more cognizant of these issues 
and to equip them with more of the tools they need to search for answers.    
We believe that our emphasis on the visual mediation of legal thinking and legal 
judgment, our constructivist method for understanding, and our pedagogy offer an 
affirmative response to questions that ultimately go to the heart of both law and 
democracy in the digital visual era.  Pictures are silent until people speak about them, and 
when people do, they begin to compare perspectives and construct socially available 
meanings.  Learning how to respond critically to pictures and to articulate individual 
responses is, therefore, essential to understanding how visual meanings are constructed 
and what beliefs they engender (or suppress) in particular situations.  An ethos emerges 
out of the collective practice of making, reflecting, and remaking – modeled in our 
classrooms, but applicable by extension to other collectives, whether the deliberating jury 
or the debating blogosphere.179  It is the ethos of the autocatalyzed, self-sustaining group, 
a process in which each participant inspires and teaches others with ever less explicit 
guidance from “above,” with the eventual result being the generation of a shared group 
culture. We do not know how this experience will carry over into the larger and more 
complex world of professional practice, but we believe that using the multidisciplinary 
tools we have described in this essay to make and critique images empowers people to 
become more active participants in both popular and legal culture. We also believe that 
lawyers who are able to navigate the new currents that pervade our social and cultural 
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lives as well as our lives in the law will become better guides in the face of a crucial, and 
shared, rhetorical challenge: Whether it is more prudent to exercise belief or suspicion 
under specific conditions.180
Meeting this challenge will require a new intellectual framework for law, one that 
incorporates not only the familiar word-and-text mode of legal thinking but also the 
pervasively visual, hypermediated, and digital mode that increasingly characterizes the 
practice of law today.  In short, the imperative that legal scholars face is to rethink the 
theory and practice of law in and through the visual.  Thus may we begin to come to grips 
with the various ways in which visual communication technologies are transforming the 
practice, theory, and teaching of law in the digital age.
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